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I've got a lil' story ain't got no moral 
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Will it go round in circles? 
Will it fly high like a bird up in the sky? 
BILLY PRESTON, Will it Go Round in Circles, on MUSIC IS My LIFE (A&M Records, 
Inc. 1972). 
"Goin' round in circles" is a reference to the circular argument that subprime 
borrowers are choosing the non-traditional mortgage products found in the mar-
ket as informed market participants or rational buyers and therefore shoulder 
the total responsibility for their inability to repay the loans. This neoclassical 
economic argument obscures the fact that many products in today's consumer 
mortgage market are designed to fail, which is inapposite to the consumer's ex-
pectation to receive an affordable and sustainable mortgage loan product. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Home ownership is an American dream. Yet, America faces a cri-
sis in the residential housing market that threatens that dream for 
many. Approximately 2.2 million borrowers with home equity totaling 
$164 billion or almost one-third of outstanding subprime mortgages 
will face foreclosure. 2 An even greater number of subprime home 
2. The Center for Responsible Lending ("CRL") has estimated the percentage of 
foreclosures based on performance of the home mortgage loans over the life of the 
loan. ELLEN SCHLOEMER, WEI LI, KEITH ERNST, AND KATHLEEN KEEST, CTR. FOR 
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LoSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET 
AND THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS 15-16 (2006) (hereinafter LoSING GROUND), 
available at http://www.responsiblelending.orglpdfslFC-paper-12-19-new-cover-1. 
pdf. 
These numbers are based on the fourth quarter of 2006. According to the 
Mortgage Bankers Association ("MBA"), this number represents an increase of 14 
basis points from the third quarter of 2006. Press Release, The Mortgage Bank· 
ers Ass'n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Increase in Latest MBA National De-
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loans, 16.31% are delinquent, with 2.12% beginning foreclosure in the 
third quarter of 2007 and 6.89% of the delinquent subprime loans in 
foreclosure at the end of the third quarter.3 Loans totaling $164 bil-
lion are delinquent in monthly mortgage payments.4 Ironically, these 
rising delinquency and foreclosure rates are due in large part to 
greater access to credit for homebuyers through the subprime lending 
market.5 Though subprime lending6 has filled a credit gap and ad-
dressed the problem of access to mortgage financing by creating a new 
linquency Survey (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/ 
NewsandMedialPressCenter/58758.htm. See also, Joint Econ. Comm., The Sub-
prime Lending Crisis: The Economic Impact on Wealth, Property Values and Tax 
Revenues, and How We Got Here, S. Rep. No. 110-251 at 71-78 (2007) (estimat-
ing the number of foreclosures for the third quarter of 2007 through the end of 
2009 to be around 1.66 million, and the related property loss around $106 billion). 
3. In the mortgage market, serious delinquencies are around 1% and foreclosures 
0.2%. In the prime market, the delinquency rate is usually about .2%. Eight 
percent of subprime loans were seriously delinquent, meaning 90 days or more, 
during 2006 and the first half of 2007 as compared with 6% in 2005 and the first 
half of 2006. The foreclosure rate has climbed from 1.5% at the end of 2005 to 
2.5%. During 2000-2002, serious delinquencies were about 12%, and foreclosures 
ranged from 2.5% to 3%. Press Release, The Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, Delinquen-
cies and Foreclosures Increase in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Dec. 
6, 2007), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.orglNewsandMedialPress 
Center/58758.htm. See also, Joint Econ. Comm., The Subprime Lending Crisis: 
The Economic Impact on Wealth, Property Values and Tax Revenues, and How 
We Got Here, S. Rep. No. 110-251 at 71-78 (2007) (estimating the number of 
foreclosures for the third quarter of 2007 through the end of 2009 to be around 
1.66 million, and the related property loss around $106 billion.) The most recent 
estimate projected $3 million in defaults this year and next leading ultimately to 
2 million in lost homes. The Growing Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis: Identifying 
Solutions and Dispelling Myths, Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Administra-
tive and Commercial Law, 110th Congo 52 (2008) (statement of Mark M. Zandi, 
Ph.D., Chief Economist, Moody's Economy.com, Inc.). 
4. Numbers are based on the fourth quarter of 2006 on a seasonally adjusted basis. 
This number is up 28 basis points from the third quarter, and up 25 basis points 
from one year ago, according to MBA's National Delinquency Survey. Press Re-
lease, The Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Increase in 
Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Mar. 13, 2007), available at http:// 
www.mortgagebankers.orglNewsandMedialPressCenter/50974.htm. 
In July 2007, Standard & Poor's changed the ratings on $10 billion of debt 
from structured investment vehicles sponsored by Cheyne Capital Management 
from AAA to CCC. Eric Dash, S.& P. Cuts British Firm's Debt Rating, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2007, at C1. 
5. The emergence of a subprime market for residential mortgages has closed a 
credit gap by making home ownership more affordable. In 1995, the subprime 
home loan market was valued at $65 million. 1 INSIDE MORTGAGE FINANCE PuB. 
LICATIONS, THE 2007 MORTGAGE MARKET STATISTICAL ANNUAL 222 (2007). By 
2006, the total volume of subprime loans was $600 billion, down from $665 billion 
in 2005. Today, subprime mortgage originations constitute 23% of all mortgages. 
Id. at 209. The subprime market has also filled a market gap by allowing credit-
impaired homeowners to borrow against the equity in their homes to meet a vari-
ety of needs. Cassandra Jones Havard, Democratizing Credit: Examining the 
Structural Inequities of SUbprime Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 233, 259 (2005). 
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market for home ownership, it has created more opportunities for abu-
sive lending.7 Borrowers have entered into financially detrimental 
and imprudent loans, often without being fully aware of or under-
standing the substance of their commitments. These often predatory 
loans are characterized by product terms and features such as inter-
est-only, high loan-to-value ("LTV") ratios, low start rates, and adjust-
able rates. Borrowers also have entered into mortgage agreements 
with high debt-to-income ratios; loans in which the monthly payment 
was large relative to the borrower's income.8 Many of these borrowers 
received loans without providing supporting documentation of their 
income or even providing a down payment.9 The rising number of 
subprime mortgage foreclosures threatens to undermine the signifi-
cant home ownership gains made over the past two decades.10 
Some argue that the current crisis merely represents market fail-
ure. ll The massive defaults in the subprime mortgage markets, the 
explanation goes, demonstrate that credit-impaired borrower markets 
are risky and have no place in the usually stable mortgage sector. This 
explanation supports the imperative that private, free market policies 
are the best solution to address both imperfections and inequality in 
the market and that the current subprime mortgage crisis is a neces-
6. Virtually all predatory mortgages have subprime characteristics, though the vast 
majority of subprime mortgages cannot be characterized as predatory. See Kath-
leen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Eco· 
nomics of Predatory Lending, BO TEx. L. REV. 1255, 1260, n.6 (2002). 
7. "Because of innovations in the prime and subprime mortgage market, nearly 9 
million new homeowners are now able to live in their own homes, improve their 
neighborhoods, and use their homes to build wealth." Edward M. Gramlich, 
Govenor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Address at the Financial Services Roundtable Annual 
Housing Policy Meeting, Chicago, Illinois (May 21, 2004). 
B. A Center for Responsible Lending Study projects that lout of 5 subprime borrow-
ers will default on their mortgages over a 10 year period. SCHLOEMER, ET AL, 
supra note 2, at 19. 
9. There is no consensus on what constitutes predatory lending, but there are three 
common features, loan flipping, high fees, and pricing. David J. Weiner, Assignee 
Liability in State Predatory Lending Laws: How Uncapped Punitive Damages 
Threaten the Secondary Mortgage Market, 55 EMORY L.J. 535, 546-49 (2006). 
10. See generally Heather McCulloch, Promoting Economic Security for Working 
Families: State Asset·Building Initiatives, 7 Housing Facts and Findings, Vol. 2, 
at 3 (2005), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hff/pdfl 
HFF_v7i2.pdf; GWENDOLYN WRIGHT, BUILDING THE DREAM: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
HOUSING IN THE UNITED STATES (19B1). 
11. Subprime Lending: Defining the Market and Its Customers: J. Hearing Before the 
H. Subcomm. On housing and Community Opportunity and the H. Comm. on Fi-
nancial Services, 10Bth Congo 73-76,267-72 (statement of Anthony Yeazer, Pro-
fessor of Economics, George Washigton University). Cf. Athanasios Orphandies 
& John C. Williams, Robust Monetary Policy with Imperfect Knowledge (Fed. 
Res. Board Working Paper No. 33-2007), available at http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/pubS/feds/2007 1200733/200733pap. pdf. 
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sary market correction. 12 Irrational borrowers, the line of reasoning 
continues, who accepted, rather than rejected, onerous loan terms 
must now bear the consequences of their actions. 
To the contrary, the current crisis in the subprime mortgage sector 
is due to a market that has failed borrowers.13 Mortgage market ex-
pansion should be seen as a means to address economic inequality 
with the expectation that the market operates in a manner consistent 
with borrower expectations.14 Market-driven innovations, such as the 
subprime lending market, must be scrutinized for inequality in the 
treatment of vulnerable borrowers. Such inequality must be rooted 
out and rejected to ensure that the financially under-served receive 
their fair share of economic growth. In the context of subprime lend-
ing, that fair share is measured against policies and practices that 
cause marginalization and subordination.15 Quite simply, this theory 
advocates that subprime lending policies must support mortgage 
sustainabili ty .16 
Mortgage sustainability, or affordable mortgage financing, is pres-
ently impacted negatively by the securitization of subprime loans. 
Securitization of loans is an underappreciated factor that paralleled 
the evolution of the subprime mortgage market.17 Securitization has 
increased the availability of subprime mortgage credit and spawned a 
more significant function for mortgage brokers in the lending 
process.18 
12. See infra Part I1.B.3 for a discussion of how subprime lending also addresses is-
sues of inequality. For a discussion of the effects of privatization in another con-
text see Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized 
Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569 (2001). 
13. See generally Douglas G. Baird, Discharge, Waiver, and the Behavioral Undercur-
rents of Debtor-Creditor Law, 73 U. CHI LAW. REV. 16, (2007); Ian Ayres, Menus 
Matter, 73 U. CHI LAW. REV. 1 (2007). 
14. Affordable housing measures evaluate whether a buyer can qualifY for the loan 
and afford the initial down payment as well as whether the homeowner is able to 
sustain the mortgage payments over time. Predatory loans conflict with housing 
affordability objectives by creating a pricing structure that which leads to the 
buyer defaulting on the loan. 
15. See Havard, Democratizing Credit, supra note 5, at 269-75. 
16. See Mark Wiranowski, Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, 
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, Sustaining Home Ownership Through 
Education and Counseling, Oct. 2003, http://www.jchs.harvard.eduJpublications/ 
homeownership/w03-7 _ wiranowski.pdf. 
17. The consolidation of the banking industry has resulted in the transformation of 
many sectors of the financial services industry. See generally Arthur E. Wil-
marth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidatwn, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 
215,241-49 (2002) (arguing that bank profitability is declining as a result of com-
petition and consolidation). 
18. As used in this Article, mortgage brokers means mortgage brokers, bankers, and 
lenders, all of which would be subject to the proposed regulations. See discussion 
infra Part III. 
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Mortgage brokers perform many of the tasks involved in loan origi-
nation.19 They are also instrumental in identifying a broader market 
of lenders for potential borrowers. A mortgage broker's specialized 
knowledge and access to multiple lending sources is particularly help-
ful to borrowers who have been traditionally excluded from the mar-
ket due to credit risks. When mortgage brokers function effectively 
and legitimately, they recommend loans with reasonable terms that 
are suited to the borrower's financial circumstance. But mortgage 
brokers' actions go largely unchecked and consequently some brokers 
recommend deceptive, unreasonable loan terms and unnecessarily 
high interest rates.20 The combination of the effects of unscrupulous 
mortgage brokers and subprime lending has failed to fully protect 
credit-impaired borrowers, resulting in higher delinquency and fore-
closure rates. Seventy percent of the now delinquent subprime loans 
were made by mortgage brokers.21 Thus, the role of the mortgage bro-
ker in the subprime market requires critical examination. 
The primary regulation of mortgage brokers currently resides with 
the states, with some states having little or no regulation.22 Federal 
regulation of mortgage brokers offers an answer to the abuse that has 
accompanied the expanded access to subprime loans. This Article ar-
gues that the mortgage broker industry requires strengthened joint 
federal and state legislation because an unregulated industry poses a 
significant economic risk by confusing the interrelated issues of access 
with quality. 
Part I of this Article discusses the structural framework of the 
mortgage broker industry. It describes the use and development of 
19. See generally Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., A Taxonomic Analysis of Mortgage Broker Li-
censing Statutes: Developing a Programmatic Response to Predatory Lending, 36 
N.M. L. REV. 297 (2006) (comparing and contrasting the the licensing statutes in 
four different states). 
Mortgage brokers participate in more than 68% of home loans originations. 
The remaining 32% is retail done through the lenders retail channel, which 
means the lender does not go through a broker. See Licensing and Registration in 
the Mortgage Industry: Licensing and Registration in the Mortgage Industry: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity of the 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Congo 70 (2005) (hereinafter Licensing and Registra-
tion Hearing) (statement of Joseph L. Falk, President, Irian Mortgage Servs., on 
behalf of the Nat'l Ass'n of Mortgage Brokers). The National Association of Mort-
gage Brokers estimates that "mortgage broker operations across the nation origi-
nate 65% of all residential loans in the U.S." Id. 
20. See generally Lawrence Hansen, In Brokers We Trust-Mortgage Licensing Stat-
utes Address Predatory Lending Regulation, 14 J. Affordable Housing & Commu-
nity. Dev. 332 (2005); Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Effecting Responsibility in the 
Mortgage Broker-Borrower Relationship: A Role for Agency Principles in Preda-
tory Lending Regulation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471 (2005). 
21. Georgette C. Poindexter, Subordinated Rolling Equity: Analyzing Real Estate 
Loan Default in the Era of Securitization, 50 EMORY L.J. 519, 525 (2001). 
22. See discussion infra Part II. 
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mortgage brokers and how some loans they endorse involve poten-
tially reckless lending practices. These are loans designed to disad-
vantage borrowers because they are designed to fail. It then explains 
how these practices support abusive, predatory lending. Part I con-
cludes by arguing that the societal costs of home ownership loss for a 
particularly vulnerable segment of borrowers justify a more compre-
hensive federal program. 
Part II presents the corrective framework for the mortgage broker 
industry. Beginning with a discussion of the federalism debate in 
banking law, it briefly reviews the constitutional feasibility of any fed-
eral regulation in this area. It argues that the current legal frame-
work is inadequate to address the potential economic risks that 
mortgage brokers impose. The private securitization of subprime 
loans creates a moral hazard thereby justifying the need for the impo-
sition of a fiduciary duty. 
Finally, Part III addresses why a federal approach is needed and 
explains what such a regime should address. Recognizing that all bor-
rowers, not just subprime borrowers, will benefit from mortgage bro-
ker regulation, it argues for a comprehensive change in the regulatory 
structure and applies the standard to all mortgage finance partici-
pants. Adopting this standard replaces the existing ad hoc, voluntary 
acts that currently protect only some borrowers and will result in an 
appropriate level of mortgage finance regulation that offers greater 
protection to all mortgage borrowers. 
II. THE MORTGAGE BROKER INDUSTRY-
THE STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Mortgage Brokers and Financial Intermediation 
1. The Mortgage Broker Industry 
The mortgage origination process involves several different tasks. 
A loan officer interviews the potential borrower and gathers informa-
tion about the borrower's finances, including their assets and liabili-
ties, that are needed for processing the loan. The loan officer then 
assists the borrower in preparing an application. Assuming the bor-
rower's income and debt ratio qualify for the loan, and following an 
appraisal of the property to ensure that the amount of the loan does 
not exceed the value of the property, the loan is funded. It then be-
comes the responsibility of the underwriter to determine whether the 
loan is eligible for the recommended mortgage product.23 
23. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 regarding underwriting and fiduciary duties. 
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When a mortgage broker originates a loan, the mortgage broker 
takes on specific tasks as the lender's agent.24 A mortgage broker and 
lender agree that the broker will represent the lender in offering the 
lender's loan products to potential borrowers.25 Mter interviewing 
the potential borrower and gathering personal information for 
processing the loan, the broker also evaluates the potential borrower's 
financial status, considering affordability and stated preferences, and 
may make recommendations regarding appropriate underwriting and 
the source for funding.26 
Mortgage brokers have become an instrumental part of the lending 
process, and mortgage brokerage is big business. In 2004, mortgage 
origination totaled $1.4 trillion dollars and 50% of loan originations 
loans were made through broker applications.27 The mortgage bro-
kerage industry has changed the distribution channels for loans, with 
banks relying on mortgage brokers to negotiate credit with borrowers 
and to develop and capture market share.28 
2. The Economics of the Mortgage Transaction 
a. Financial Intermediation 
Financial intermediation is the process of managing risk by bun-
dling, distributing, and pricing it. Financing a mortgage loan involves 
a mortgage broker, who either funds or arranges funding for the bor-
24. Brokers who are correspondent lenders do not have to disclose the fees that they 
receive from borrowers. Correspondent lenders choose an institutional lender 
based the mortgage products offered and may fund mortgages from their own 
funds or from the line of credit received from an institutional lender. Mortgages 
funded with correspondent loans are pre-arranged to be sold immediately to an-
other lender. Brokers may become correspondent lender by building up capital 
and being able to fund mortgages out of those proceeds. 
25. As used here, mortgage broker may mean either a broker, a mobile home dealer, 
or a home improvement contractor. 
26. "Retail loan origination," may involve mortgage lenders and includes the adver-
tising and solicitation ofthe loan product; receiving, by interviewing the potential 
borrower, the loan application; and performing some or all ofthe processing of the 
application information. The mortgage products offered to a borrower are also 
dictated by the lender's funding programs. Brokers may do a preliminary under-
writing review in order to assist the consumer in choosing a lender and product. 
Typically, however, the broker neither performs the final underwriting nor 
makes the credit decision. Gary Rice, Selected Issues Relating to Banking and the 
Internet, 156 PLIICorp 803, 843 (1999). 
27. See The National Association of Mortgage Brokers, Industry Facts, http://namb. 
orginambllndustry_Facts.asp (last visited Jan. 15,2008). 
28. This is particularly true in the areas where banks have closed their retail 
branches. Banks must now rely on mortgage brokers to create their market share 
in these areas. See Orrice M. Williams, U.S. Governmental Accountability Office, 
Alternative Mortgage Products: Impact on Defaults Remains Unclear, but Disclo-
sure of Risks to Borrowers Could Be Improved, Rep. No. GAO-06-1112T (2006). 
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rower, a lender that purchases the loan at the time of closing,29 and 
an investment company that adds the individual loan to a pool of 
loans that are sold on the secondary market and in turn, sells secon-
dary market bonds to individual or corporate investors.3o Each of 
these sales is an important link in the cycle of financial intermedia-
tion and creates more financing for loans.31 
Securitization is a byproduct of financial intermediation. By 
securitizing loans, an indirect source of funding is created.32 The sec-
ondary mortgage market arguably makes subprime lending more effi-
cient because it bridges the information gap for investors through 
uniformity.33 Inefficiencies in the traditional governmental funding 
29. A mortgage now can be: 
(1) originated by a mortgage broker who makes money only from 
origination; 
(2) serviced by a mortgage banker who did not originate the loan and 
may have bought the right to service the loan from another mortgage 
banker; 
(3) originated with the credit risk taken by one of the secondary market 
institutions, perhaps along with a mortgage insurance company; and 
(4) funded by a mortgage-backed security (MBS) sold into the capital 
markets, and the MBS can be packaged as a bundle of derivative securi-
ties that separate interest rate and prepayment risk among different 
investors. 
David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory 
Lending to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
985, 994 (2006). Mortgage loans may be furnished by an institutional lender who 
makes a loan to the broker or originator. Alternatively, a mortgage banking com-
pany often funds the loan using a warehousing line of credit. Warehouse lending 
involves an institutional lender and an originator, which may be a financial insti-
tution or a mortgage bank. The institutional lender makes a loan to the origina-
tor which in turn funds the mortgage for the borrower. The institutional lender 
is repaid with proceeds from the sale of loans to investors on the secondary 
market. 
30. The transfer is from the mortgage banking subsidiary to the special purpose vehi-
cle ("SPV"), to the underwriter and the investors. See Tamar Frankel, Securitiza-
tion: The Conflict Between Personal and Market Law (Contract and Property), 18 
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 197,211-17 (1999). 
31. The most common mortgage funding options are table loans, correspondent loans 
and wholesale loans. In table financing, the originator sells the loans immedi-
ately after closing. The originator earns a profit by charging the borrower an 
origination fee, which is essentially payment for funding a lender. Leonard A. 
Bernstein, Regulation of Mortgage Banking: a Pennsylvania Paradigm,116 BANK-
ING L.J. 150, 161 (1999). 
32. For example, secondary purchases require lenders to make representations that 
the borrowers were evaluated for their creditworthiness and that the property 
has been appraised using previously agreed upon appraisal standards. Henry T. 
Greely, Contracts as Commodities: the Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the 
Form of Contracts, 42 V AND. L. REV. 133 (1989) (discussing how standardization 
of contract terms creates efficiency). 
33. See Joseph C. Shenker, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New 
Frontiers, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1369, 1383-90 (1991). Further, projected growth in the 
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sources created a need for private money in this particular economic 
sector.34 AB a financing structure, securitization has increased abu-
sive mortgage lending.35 Structured financing in the secondary sub-
prime market requires a number of transfers and with each transfer 
the actual terms of the loan escapes scrutiny.36 As will be discussed 
below, when the transfer is made to the rating agency prior to sale to 
the investors, there is little or no objectivity about the fairness of the 
transaction and whether it may be predatory.37 
Intermediation facilitates the transfer of capital and risk between 
borrowers and lenders and is justified on two grounds: (1) borrowers 
hold superior information about their own financial condition than 
prospective lenders; and (2) the search and screening process matches 
borrowers and lenders and lowers search costS.38 Mortgage brokerage 
became an essential component of the subprime mortgage origination 
market because brokers were able to reduce the costs of lending and 
facilitate intermediation. Brokers also perform services that both 
lenders and borrowers would find costly to do directly.39 By reducing 
the information asymmetry and confirming that a borrower has the 
economic resources to repay a credit obligation, mortgage brokers 
housing market, again, underscored the concern that the present financing sys-
tem was inadequate. Id. at 1388-92. See also Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or 
Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications 
of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1991) (proposing federal 
residential real estate finance laws as a way of creating integrated real estate 
finance markets). 
34. The high interest rates of the late 1970s and early 1980s contributed to a signifi-
cant decline in the private supply of credit for the housing mortgage market. 
When Senator Tower introduced the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhance-
ment Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689, he explained: 
[NJew sources for mortgage money must be found as more and more de-
mands are placed on the credit market and mortgage lenders. Due to the 
magnitude of the demand for mortgage credit, the existing Federal agen-
cies simply will be unable to provide all of the liquidity for mortgages 
that will be required during the coming decade. 
Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act: Hearing before the S. Subcomm. 
on Housing and Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, 98th Congo 1 (1983). 
35. See Evan M. Gilreath, The Entrance of Banks into Subprime Lending: First 
Union and The Money Store, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 149, 152-53 (1999). 
36. See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2185, 2215, n.182. (2007). Professor Peterson uses the term "structured financ-
ing" when discussing predatory or abusive lending. 
37. Secondary market participants have only nominal incentives to deter predatory 
lending and therefore readily participate in the structured financing scheme. See 
discussion infra Part III.B.4.b. 
38. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Suc-
cession, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1108, 1118-19 (1984) (Financial intermediation con-
nects "savers and borrowers, passive owners and active users of capital."). 
39. See generally Bruce Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies 
with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 Q. J. Econ. 229 (1986). 
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have helped to expand an emerging market that was initially difficult 
for banks to access.40 
Recognizing the scope of the innovation in the consumer mortgage 
finance markets is critical to understanding the risks posed by finan-
cial intermediation.41 Financial innovation has created mortgage 
products that unbundle risks, dividing investors according to their 
risk tolerance and, therefore, creating more liquidity. The trend now 
is for banks to serve as "equity bridges," reducing their exposure to 
large loan risks. Regulated financial institutions now distribute 
rather than hold residual risks.42 AB a result, other financial in-
termediaries actually perform the functions that create, distribute, 
and hold risk and have changed the manner in which those risks are 
defined.43 The "newer" financial intermediaries are not constrained 
by the same regulatory system that evaluates loan portfolios for safety 
and soundness.44 Perhaps because there is no safety and soundness 
40. Banks and thrifts that hold subprime mortgages may face additional regulatory 
scrutiny. Beginning in 2001, the Federal Reserve Board increased the capital 
requirements for all institutions which held subprime mortgages that equaled or 
exceeded 25% of their tier one capital reserves. The Board required lending insti-
tutions to increase capital reserves held against subprime mortgages to one-and-
one-halfto three times greater than reserves held against prime mortgages. 2001 
Guidance, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep (CCH) 'll 63-792, at 73,299-30. 
41. Governor Kevin Warsh, of the Federal Reserve Board, describes the innovation in 
the consumer mortgage finance markets as an acceleration toward complete mar-
kets that have conflated the roles among financial intermediaries. Govenor Ke-
vin Warsh, Fed. Reserve Board, Remarks at the European Economics and 
Financial Centre, London, England (June 5, 2007), available at http://www.fed-
eralreserve.gov/newseventslspeech!warsh20070605a.htm. 
42. W. Scott Frame, Diana Hancock & Wayne Passmore, Federal Home Loan Bank 
Advances and Commercial Bank Portfolio Composition 6 (Fed. Res. Bank of At-
lanta, Working Paper No. 2007-17, 2007), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/ 
filelegacydoc/wp0717. pdf. 
43. Most products are now securitized. Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bank· 
ruptcy Process: the Statutory Institutionalization of Securitization, 33 CONN. L. 
REV. 199 (2000). Most consumer purchases are now securitized. See generally 
Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1655 (2004). 
44. The availability of a liquid market makes mortgage-backed securities attractive 
to investors and the diversification among the portfolio reduces risks. See Claire 
A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 
1073-75 (1996). The secondary market for mortgages makes capital accessible 
across the country. Some argue that mortgage-backed securities are useful in re-
allocating capital by directing the loan funds into communities that are capital-
starved. Mortgage-backed securities may represent an investment in the geo-
graphical areas that they fund. In low and moderate income areas, financing 
through mortgage-backed securities represents a way for investors to reduce 
risks of delinquencies and defaults. See generally Jo Anne Bradner, The Secon· 
dary Mortgage Market and State Regulation of Real Estate Financing, 36 EMORY 
L.J. 971 (1987); Carrie Stradley Lavargna, Government-Sponsored Enterprises 
Are "Too Big to Fail": Balancing Public and Private Interests, 44 HAsTINGS L.J. 
991 (1993). 
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evaluation, they also have a higher tolerance for risk. By selling high 
risk loans to investors who are willing to accept that level of risk, in-
vestment firms are contributing to the myth of complete markets.45 
Changing the roles of regulated financial institutions in the interme-
diation process suspends their need to screen out borrowers who 
might perform poorly or even to require strong covenants or monitor 
loan performance.46 This structured finance scheme does not identify 
abusive loans, however, because the investors who purchase the 
lower-rated tranches (bundles ofloans) do not demand scrutiny of the 
actual loan terms at origination.47 
Market innovation has closed a financing gap leading to market 
growth. The presumption among some economists is that this flow of 
liquidity indicates that markets are more or less complete.48 Other 
economists question whether there can ever be a costless transac-
tion-or one in which there is no asymmetric information or transac-
tion costS.49 While innovative financial intermediation in the 
subprime market has created competitive advantages that made lend-
ing to credit-impaired borrowers less risky for lenders, it also may 
have created informational disadvantages for those borrowers. 50 
b. The Market Imperfections 
Market imperfections, or incomplete information that raises costs 
and trades, affects whether individuals will enter into a transaction.51 
Knowing what those costs are is critical to the decision of whether the 
45. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street 
Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2040-41 (2007) (dis-
cussing Wall Street's practice of securitizing and selling loan pools without inves-
tigating their predatory lending characteristics). 
46. Failure to demand scrutiny means that as the loans are sold they are freely as-
signable and the borrower loses the rights to challenge the original transaction. 
See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, 
and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 511-13 
(2002). 
47. Petersen, supra note 36, at 2204 (describing how subprime mortgage tranches 
are tailored to meet the investors's needs). 
48. The concept of complete markets means that risks are priced and traded without 
significant diminution in value. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard 
Debreu, Existence of Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22 Econometrica 
265 (1954). 
49. See, e.g., Greenwald & Stiglitz, supra note 39. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz 
Federalism in Securities Regulation: An Economist's Perspective, 40 U.S.F. L.REV. 
805 (2006). 
50. See generally Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corpo· 
ration Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261(1958) (de-
bating the relevance of these costs in determining the value of a small business). 
51. Ramon P. DeGennaro, Market Imperfections 3-4 (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, 
Working Paper No. 2005-12, 2005), available at http://www.frbatianta.org/fileleg-
acydocs/wp0512. pdf. 
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transaction is cost-efficient from the borrower's perspective. Reducing 
the high cost of imperfect information is also essential to the lender 
who would otherwise use adverse selection to screen out a borrower, 
but who, if the costs are reduced, might find lending profitable. 
£. Transaction Costs 
One cost of lending is transaction cost. Financial intermediation 
reduces search costs by pairing borrowers with lenders.52 Lenders 
and investors are served when intermediaries assist in diversifYing 
risk and providing liquidity. Finding investors is costly and borrowers 
who have to do so on their own find it difficult. Securitization is help-
ful in reducing the transaction costs of lending precisely because 
strictly private investment is difficult for the individual borrower to 
arrange. 
Brokers also provide market access for lenders. A broker's loan 
recommendation, however, begins a series of transactions that may 
affect loan sustainability <whether the borrower can afford the loan). 
Mortgage brokers are essentially sellers of loan products and receive 
compensation based on those sales. Competition among lenders can 
be fierce for certain broker client bases and markets resulting in in-
creased compensation. As an industry, mortgage brokerage has devel-
oped indiscriminately with varying obligations and rules at the state 
level. 53 
Mortgage brokers playa distinct role in reducing the lender's fi-
nancing costs and thus the overall costs of the loan.54 For the lender, 
a mortgage broker is the first evaluator of information. They may offer 
advice and information to a potential borrower that increases the bor-
rower's creditworthiness. Mortgage brokers also presumably make 
the lender's market more competitive by identifYing a broader market 
52. Ichiro Kobayashi, Private Contracting and Business Models of Electronic Com-
merce, 13 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 161, 176-180 (2005). 
53. The United States is not alone in recognizing that the failure to have barriers to 
entry for mortgage brokers disadvantages borrowers. Australia has studied the 
problem of abusive mortgage broker behavior and instituted reforms. See Con-
sumer Credit Legal Centre, A Report to the ASIC on Finance and Mortgage Bro-
ker Industry (2003) http://www.asic.gov.auiasidpdflib.nsflLookupByFileNamei 
Finance_mortgagebrokers_report.pdf7$filelFinance_mortgagebrokersreport.pdf 
(identifying problems when consumers have been exploited by borrowers). 
54. The "retailing" of loans requires not only the time of lender personnel, but also 
the bearing of the cost of real estate ownership or rental, i.e., the "bricks and 
mortar," as well as the expense of payroll and benefits, business machines, sup-
plies, insurance and other costs necessary to maintain a retail branch. Cf. Sid-
dhartha Venkatesan, Abrogating the Holder in Due Course Doctrine in Subprime 
Mortgage Transactions to More Effectively Police Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PuB. POL'y 177 (2004) (discussing the FTC's abrogation of the holder in 
due course doctrine in consumer retail lending). 
750 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:737 
of potential borrowers. 55 They are often key in identifying and reach-
ing customer bases which because of geography, or a lack of contact or 
knowledge, might otherwise have never accessed the lender's prod-
ucts, thereby increasing competition. 56 
Borrowers have come to expect a mortgage broker's assistance in 
loan preparation. In many cases that assistance is critical to a deter-
mination that a borrower is creditworthy.57 The borrower's transac-
tion costs are significantly reduced when there is a ready market for 
subprime loans because of the liquidity of the underlying loan. The 
borrower pays less for credit review and documentation. Any appar-
ent reduction in transaction costs helps to provide more access to 
credit for the marginal borrower. 
Arguably, broker participation in the origination process has dra-
matically reduced the transaction costs of origination. 58 In a complex 
residential finance market with numerous options, borrowers benefit 
from mortgage brokers' assistance in selecting and arranging financ-
ing. While a potential borrower seeks access to the most competitive 
lending opportunities, it is the mortgage broker who has easy access to 
lenders and is aware of the guidelines and incentives. In the vast ma-
jority of cases, however, the broker will have developed relationships 
with various lenders, and will serve as the "retailer" of the lenders' 
loan products to consumers. In that role, the broker serves as an 
agent to both the borrower and the lender. 59 In such instances, the 
brokerllender relationship is non-exclusive, and the broker is under no 
obligation whatsoever to submit any borrower's loan application to 
any particular lender for approval and funding. Brokers are thus free 
55. Lenders not only pay mortgage brokers a commission when the mortgage loan is 
made but may also pay a third party for identifying customers. Craig Steven 
Delsack, The Mortgage Contingency Clause: A Trap for the Residential Real Es· 
tate Purchaser Using a Mortgage Broker, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 299, 307-310 
(1995). 
56. Jessica Fogel, State Consumer Protection Statutes: An Alternative Approach to 
Solving the Problem of Predatory Mortgage Lending, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 435, 
438-440 (describing the subprime market as one without much competition and 
this much leeway for brokers). 
57. Harold L. Levine, A Real Estate Focus a Day in the Life of a Residential Mortgage 
Defendant, 36 J. MARsHALL L. REV. 687, 706 (2003). 
58. Ifloans are over-priced, ultimately borrowers pay. The mortgage broker industry 
also posits that broker participation has increased the sheer number of eligible 
borrowers due to broker's ability to expertly navigate through the complex array 
of fmancial products. The question is whether these brokers have contributed to 
the high default and foreclosure rates. See generally Howell E. Jackson & Laurie 
Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread Premiums, 12 
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 289 (2007) (endorsing penalties against mortgage brokers 
who receive the primary part of their compensation from yield spread premiums). 
59. See Wilson, Effecting Responsibility, supra note 19, at 1507-08 (discussing bor-
rower's expectations in the mortgage broker relationship). 
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to choose anyone of several wholesale lenders' products for a particu-
lar borrower.6o 
ll. Information Costs 
Lenders also price loans according to information costs. Credit ra-
tioning is attributed to asymmetrical information costs. Asymmetri-
cal information is defined as the borrower having superior knowledge 
about his or her ability to repay the loan obligation as compared to the 
lender. Lenders often choose between making loans at high interest 
rates or declining to extend credit. Adverse selection contributes to 
this dilemma. Adverse selection means that only a few borrowers will 
be offered loans at a higher interest rate in order to control the risk of 
the loan portfolio and to assure that the lender meets its net profit 
goals.61 
Mortgage brokers have oddly both eased adverse selection and be-
gun advantageous selection. Because mortgage brokers are willing to 
gather more information about high-risk borrowers, they are better at 
screening and assessing the risks. Mortgage brokers exercise a signif-
icant informational advantage over lenders who, because of search 
costs and regulatory restrictions, have more difficulty qualifying 
credit-impaired borrowers. The current regulatory rules enforce the 
informational asymmetries between credit-impaired borrowers and 
regulated financial institutions.62 Mortgage brokers have also "in-
creased" adverse selection in that they have consistently identified a 
prototype subprime borrower, oftentimes seeking them out and alleg-
edly steering them to higher risk loan products.63 The growth of the 
subprime market demonstrates that credit rationing is reduced under 
certain circumstances.64 
60. Borrowers' remedies are extremely limited. Subprime mortgage servicers are 
usually outside the scope of the Unfair Deceptive Acts and Practice Laws 
("UDAP"), and borrowers face difficult burdens of proof and persuasion. Ronald 
H. Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory Lending, 122 BANKING L.J. 483, 518 
(2005). Furthermore, the federal statutes designed to protect borrowers in mort-
gage transactions are insufficient because these loans do not fall within the scope 
of these statutes. 
61. Loretta J. Mester, Leonard I. Nakamura, & Micheline Renault, Transactions Ac· 
counts and Loan Monitoring (Rev. of Fin. Stud., Working Paper No. 05-14, 2005), 
available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/files/wps/2005/wp05-14. pdf (positing 
that transactions accounts held with financial intermediaries provide extremely 
effective monitoring of borrower's behavior). 
62. See Azmy Baher, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as 
Laboratories of Experimentation, 7 FLA. L. REV. 295, 316-18, (2005). 
63. Cecil J. Hunt, II, In the Racial Crosshair:Reconsidering Racially Targeted Preda-
tory Lending Under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 
211, 313 (2003) (arguing that a substantial amount of predatory lending is 
"racialized"). 
64. See generally Larry T. Garvin, Credit, Information, and Trust in the Law of Sales: 
The Credit Seller's Right of Reclamation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 247, 282-93 (1996). 
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iii. Agency Costs 
Lenders rely on the mortgage broker to screen loan applicants and 
assess their ability to repay. Brokers then assume a dual agency role, 
with both the lender and the borrower expecting the broker to act in 
each of their best interests. Because lenders place total reliance on 
the mortgage broker in screening the borrower and may do so without 
imposing conditions on the broker's assessment, some of the loans 
made by brokers are designed to fail, unbeknownst to the lender.65 
Borrowers, who with more careful analysis could have been screened 
out because their credit history indicates either inability or unwilling-
ness to repay, are not. When lenders actually held the mortgage loans 
that they funded in their loan portfolios, they were able to monitor 
those loans and develop information that proved useful in evaluating 
similar transactions. With lender monitoring now unnecessary, that 
informational base is lost.66 
Again financial innovation has created a market imperfection and 
the lender should be held accountable for the agent's conduct. Other-
wise, there is little or no incentive for the mortgage broker to behave 
fairly towards the borrower, creating moral hazard. Only by monitor-
ing the behavior of mortgage brokers are lenders or even secondary 
market investors actually able to control the brokers' conduct. 
The lender has a disincentive to monitor the mortgage broker be-
cause monitoring is costly. Securitizing the loan provides a further 
disincentive for monitoring because once sold and the interest as-
signed to another buyer the borrower loses all defense to the original 
transaction.67 Because the risk of default is transferred from both the 
lender and the broker to the investors, the loss is borne by the borrow-
ers. Similarly, as borrowers' risks increase and performance becomes 
more difficult, borrowers have little incentive to perform creating 
moral hazard.68 
iv. Moral Hazard 
Inappropriate behavior in the face of risk is the crux of moral haz-
ard.69 The opportunity to have some of the loss of the risky behavior 
65. See discussion infra Part 1II.B.3. 
66. In the small business lending context, it appears that information asymmetries 
are actually lessened by lenders' monitoring but this information is usually not 
readily disseminated. See Amy C. Bushaw, Small Business Loans Pools: Testing 
the Waters, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 197,209-10 (1998). 
67. Eggert, supra note 46, at 552. 
68. Moral hazard is common in most economic transactions. Moral hazard arises 
when an individual or firm is insulated from the economic consequences of their 
actions. Insurance is a typical example because it removes the financial risk of 
property ownership from the individual. 
69. See generally Seth J. Chandler, Visualizing Moral Hazard, 1 CONN. INS. L.J. 97 
(1994). 
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absorbed by another party creates an incentive to ignore the worst 
consequences of risky decision-making. Moral hazard occurs with bor-
rowers who have an inability or unwillingness to pay and, conse-
quently, default on their mortgage obligations. Moral hazard results 
often if there is some type of insurance fund that bails out borrowers 
or allows them to restructure their debt.70 Mortgage brokers bridge 
the information gap for borrowers who appear unable to repay but 
who can actually afford the debt.71 
The "other side" of moral hazard in subprime lending also has to do 
with the asymmetrical information between the mortgage broker and 
the borrower. In this regard the mortgage broker becomes an agent of 
the borrower, acting on the borrower's behalf. As discussed below, 
this creates a fiduciary duty on the part of the mortgage broker.72 The 
breach of this duty occurs when the agent exercises what might seem 
like a natural incentive to act in the agent's own interest. In mortgage 
origination, this translates into the broker offering the borrower a 
loan that is not the "best rate" but which may instead yield the broker 
a higher commission from a lender.73 The breach, when viewed from 
the borrower's perspective, happens because of information asymme-
try given the mortgage broker's access to lender's rates and products 
and the borrower's inability to have access to that same information. 
It is the borrower's inability to monitor the broker that creates this 
particular moral hazard leading to the market imperfection. 
The effect of a mortgage broker's moral hazard is that borrowers 
end up with riskier loan products than they qualifY for and the mort-
gage broker bears no responsibility for those risks. Mortgage brokers 
who breach their duty to disclose do not bear the consequences of their 
poor advice. They receive a "financial bail-out" when the loan is sold 
on the secondary market and the consequences of their breach of duty 
70. See George F. Will, Folly and the Fed, WASH.POST, Aug. 16,2007, at A15 (arguing 
against government intervention in the subprime mortgage market by restruc-
turing the loans of defaulting homeowners); Irwin Stelzer, Bernanke to the Rescue 
With a Surgical Strike, SUNDAY TIMES (London), August 19, 2007, available at 
http://business. timesonline.co. ukltollbusinesslcolumnists/article2283092.ece (dis-
cussing Federal Reserve Chairman Bernake's decision to lower the interest rate 
at the Federal Reserve's discount window). 
71. Oftentimes these borrowers appear unable to pay because they own a business, or 
participate in a cash business for which it is difficult to verify the receipt of 
income. 
72. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
73. One study of the consumer mortgage finance market argues that subprime lend-
ers have a monopoly that allows them an informational advantage and deters 
competition by restricting entry into prime markets. Because of the market 
structure, subprime lenders have developed a pricing strategy that segments sub-
prime borrowers and charges them a risk-based monopoly rate. See Jie Gan & 
Timothy J. Riddiough, Monopoly and Information Advantage in the Residential 
Mortgage Market, THE REV. OF FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2008) (on file with 
author). 
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are left with the borrower. Having received commissions from the bor-
rower and, most likely, the lending institution, brokers are not re-
quired to disgorge their profits if the loan performs poorly or fails. 
Most importantly, the borrower suffers the greatest loss. If the loan 
performs well, there has been a loss of equity because ofthe high costs 
of the loan. If the borrower defaults on the loan, the property goes into 
foreclosure. In both instances, moral hazard has disadvantaged the 
borrower, while the mortgage broker is protected. 74 
The market imperfections that cause opportunistic broker behavior 
can be corrected by providing borrowers with more information. By 
failing to address the imperfect costs of which borrowers are unaware, 
the market unfairly passes those costs on to borrowers through in-
creases in closing costs and interest rates over the life of the loan. The 
question becomes what should the regulatory and supervisory re-
sponse be given these changes in financial intermediation. A mea-
sured response evaluates risk and market infrastructure.75 As will be 
discussed in Part II, the evaluation of infrastructure leads to the con-
clusion that there should be accountability at each level of intermedi-
ary involvement whether originators, lenders, or investors. 
B. Reckless Lending 
For an individual, owning a home provides access to quality educa-
tion and promotes job stability.76 Owning a home is also a path to 
74. Robert E. Martin & David J. Smyth, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Effects 
in the Mortgage Market: An Empirical Analysis, 57 S. ECON. J., 1071, 1073-1075 
(1991). 
75. Govenor Kevin Warsh, Fed. Reserve Board, Address at the Institute of Interna-
tional Bankers Annual Washington Conference, Washington D.C., Market Li-
quidity: Definitions and Implications (Mar. 5, 2007), available at www.federal 
reserve.gov/newseventslspeech/warsh20071107 a.htm. 
76. The current crisis in the housing market disproportionately affects minority 
homeowners and consequently the minority community. Blacks and Latinos ac-
counted for 49% of the increase in home ownership rates of the last decade. 
Souphala Chomsisengphet, and Anthony Pennington-Cross, Subprime Refinanc-
ing: Equity Extraction and Mortgage Termination, (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, Working Paper No. 06-23, 2006), available at http://research.stlouisfed. 
org!wp/2006/2006-023.pdf. See also Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort, and 
Glenn B. Canner, The 2006 HMDA Data, 93 FED. RES. BULL. A73, A99 (2007), 
avaialable at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubslbulletinl2007/pdf7hmda06final. 
pdf (describing the rise in home-ownership rates among balck and hispanic 
Americans). 
Sustainable home ownership produces a financial safety net for home buyers 
and provides a foundation for a stable financial future. See Ending Mortgage 
Abuse, Safeguarding Homeowners: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm on Housing, 
Transportation, and Community Development and the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, HOth Congo 909 (2007) (testimony of Wade Hender-
son, President & CEO, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); DEBBUE GRUEN-
STEIN BOCIAN, KEITH S. ERNEST, & WEI LI, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, THE 
EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGES (2006), 
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wealth and asset accumulation for families and their future genera-
tions.77 For society, home ownership stabilizes neighborhoods.78 
Home ownership also represents an investment in local economies 
and, thereby, contributes to the country's economic growth.79 
Structural inequality, financial discrimination, and rampant greed 
have combined to produce the greatest loss of home ownership equity 
in this country.80 To suggest that the foreclosure crisis is a market 
failure is to ignore the absence of regulatory discipline that bars ac-
cess to a fair and equal system of credit. Given the peculiar market 
framework in which this lending is allowed to operate, an examination 
of the factors that contribute to this market's tolerance is essential. 
1. Underwriting Inefficiency and the Subprime Market 
The housing market is a critical part of the country's economy, as 
well as its social policy.81 Critical to the housing finance market is the 
secondary mortgage market. By selling loans to investors, the secon-
dary market facilitates more cash for loans by providing a market for 
quick liquidation of a lender's mortgage portfolio. This in turn gener-
ates cash to make more mortgages.82 The country's need for a robust 
mortgage market has fueled much of the disregard about the harmful 
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org!pdfslrrO 11-UnfaicLending-0506. 
pdf. 
77. THOMAS P. BOEHM & ALAN M. SCHLO'ITMANN, JOINT CTR. FOR Hous. STUDIES OF 
HARVARD UNIV., HOUSING AND WEALTH ACCUMULATION: INTERGENERATIONAL IM-
PACTS 16 (2001) (explaining that lower income households receive substantial 
wealth accumulation benefits from home ownership including higher educational 
attainments for children in these households). 
78. Predatory lending practices result in reverse redlining, a practice that Congress 
outlawed in the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2809. The root 
of reverse red-lining is the same as redlining-the absence of regulated lenders in 
financially underserved communities. See generally Cassandra Jones Havard, To 
Lend or Not to Lend: What The CRA Ought to Say About Predatory Lending, 7 
Fla. Coastal Law Review 1 (2005). 
79. Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing 
in a Race and Class Divided Society, 46 How. L.J. 85, 92 (2002). 
80. Richard W. Stevenson, Spending It: Focus on Home Equity Loans-Predatory 
Lending; How Serial Refinancings Can Rob Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1998, 
§ 3 (Magazine), at 10. 
81. See generally Tim Iglesias, A Place to Call Home? 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511 
(2007); Xavier de Souza Briggs & Margery Austin Turner, Assisted Housing Mo-
bility and the Success of Low-income Minority Families: Lessons for Policy, Prac-
tice, and Future Research, 1 NW J. L. & Soc. POL'y 25 (2006) (examining whether 
housing polices that require the relocation of low-income persons are effective). 
82. Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market-A Catalyst for Change in 
Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. L.J. 991, 1013 (1986) (describing the secondary 
mortgage market as reducing the costs of home financing and increasing a local 
market's economic stability). 
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effects of the subprime secondary mortgage market.83 Home mort-
gages are now complex products, produced through multiple channels 
and an array of secondary market processes. Many mortgage lenders, 
especially in the subprime market, have tailored their practices and 
policies to place most of the risks of these complex products on the 
borrower. 
A predominant flaw in the subprime market is the way that rating 
agencies provide ratings for mortgage-backed securities.84 Rating 
agencies evaluate four key aspects of a securitization transaction: (1) 
frequency of default, (2) severity of loss given default, (3) pool charac-
teristics, and (4) credit enhancement and the structure of the security. 
The evaluation of the four key aspects require an analysis off our addi-
tional factors: (1) qualitative, (2) quantitative, (3) servicing, and (4) 
legal risk.85 It is the lack of oversight over this evaluative process 
that indeed creates a problematic pricing structure for subprime 
10ans.86 
Investors use the ratings to assess the probability that the under-
lying mortgages will be re-paid timely. In this regard, the agencies 
reduce the common information asymmetry thereby making the se-
curities more marketable. Use of the rating system is endorsed by fed-
eral regulations.87 Although there are numerous complaints that the 
rating system is based on inaccurate information, the rating systems 
do not have an incentive to be sensitive to anything other than inves-
83. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Eval· 
uation of the Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TuL. 
L. REV. 373, 393-94 (1994). 
84. Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Services, and Fitch Ratings are the three 
major bond and securities rating agencies that rate mortgage-backed securities. 
All three rating agencies have rating guidelines that prohibit favorable ratings 
for any securities that are governed by state predatory lending statutes. Freddie 
Mae and Fannie Mac also have policy guidelines that do not allow either entity to 
purchase any loans that have predatory lending features. 
85. Reiss, supra note 29, at 1013-14. Mortgage-backed securities are divided into 
tranches, or Collateralized Debt Obligations ("CD Os"). The CDOs are classified 
according to risk, equity (high risk), mezzanine (middle risk) and the much 
sought-after investment grade bonds (low risk). [d. 
86. See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 4fH:i4 
(2004); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs 
Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 627-54 (1999); 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Par-
adox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 15; see also Arthur Pinto, Control and Responsibility 
of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMPo L. SUPP. 
341(2006) (highlighting the lack of control and oversight over credit rating agen-
cies in the United States). 
87. The rating agencies use a self-determination process. There are proposed rules 
for deeper scrutiny, but under the present system of regulation, the SEC makes a 
case by case determination regarding Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations ("NRSROs") for recognition. See Definition of Nationally Recog-
nized Statistical Rating Organization, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-l0 (2007). 
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tor interest.88 The assigned rating8 make the mortgage pools sold in 
the capital markets valuable or invaluable, depending on what they 
are.89 
Investment banks can create a proportion of highly marketable 
bonds out of a package oflow-quality mortgages. They do this by sep-
arately ranking the tranches. The equity portion of a subprime loan is 
classified at the highest risk level because of the probability that the 
loan will not be re-paid by the borrower. This is also the tranche that 
receives the highest profit, but receives loss first if the loan becomes 
non-performing. The mezzanine tranche also has a fairly good pros-
pect of non-payment. The lowest tranche, the investment-grade bond, 
has a chance ofre-payment, which is why the ratings agencies give the 
lowest-risk tranche a credit rating high enough to qualify for the criti-
cal investment grade rating.9o It is fairly standard, for example, to 
convert a large package of mortgage-backed securities into perhaps 
80% investment-grade bonds, 10% mezzanine, and 10% equity.91 But, 
this is a matter of discretion among the firms. 
The rating agencies do not issue consistent ratings and are not re-
quired to use the same information to create them. It is difficult 
therefore to know whether the information used is even appropriate.92 
Some evidence suggests that the agencies are becoming more con-
servative and may be biased against financial innovation.93 While the 
88. Gretchen Morgenson, Wanted: Credit Ratings. Objective Ones, Please, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2005, at 01 (reviewing criticism of privileged rater oligopoly); The 
Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Rellief Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 2990 Before 
the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 109th Congo 31 (2005) (statement of Sean J. Egan, 
Managing Director, Egan-Jones Ratings Company) ("[A)dditional competition 
should encourage the issuance of timely, accurate ratings."). SEC representa-
tives have argued, however, that market forces may keep the number ofNRSROs 
down, whatever the application process. See Hill, supra note 86, at 57-59. 
89. Federally regulated financial institutions cannot purchase asset-backed securi-
ties that do not have the requisite rating. Specifically OTS and OCC regulations 
require that the purchase must satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, in-
vestment guidelines, covenant restrictions, or internal policies. Investment Se-
curities, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1, 7 (2007). 
90. The majority of the higher-yield securities are in the form of collateralized debt 
obligations (COOs) backed by "synthetic" high-rated tranches of securitized sub-
prime mortgages, which have been losing market value due to the defaults in the 
subprime-mortgage market. Paul Tustain, Subprime Mortgage Collapse: Why 




92. See, e.g., Larry G. Perry, The Effect of Bond Rating Agencies on Bond Rating 
Models, 8 J. FIN. REs. 307, 313 (1985) (citing the frequency of disagreement be-
tween S & P and Moody's at 58%). 
93. See Hill, supra note 86, at 64; see also Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 22 ("[T)he 
rating agency system, as presently constituted, is conservatively biased against 
innovation. "). 
758 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:737 
rating agencies perform a much needed function, they exert tremen-
dous influence on the risk ratings and thus, the sUbprime loan mar-
ket. This raises the issue of whether the rating agencies favor states 
that do not regulate predatory lending.94 By giving less favorable rat-
ings to loans that are not subject to state anti-predatory lending rules, 
the rating agencies actually protect investors to the detriment of bor-
rowers who must purchase loans from lenders who are not policed for 
their abusive practices. 
The critical nature of the role that the rating agencies play argues 
against market efficiency.95 While many have touted the subprime 
market as efficient, others have questioned the market's profit-mak-
ing strategies.96 The infrastructure, which is based on financing loans 
where there is an expected poor performance by the borrower, a prin-
cipal balance that is not repaid, and yet investors who continue to re-
ceive returns, undercuts the notion of rationality. 
It is more difficult to renegotiate loans that have been securitized 
because they have been divided into different tranches. For this rea-
son, secondary market investors do not seriously police predatory 
lending activity. The investors' concern about the risk of the invest-
ment results in the rating agencies imposing conditions that make the 
pool of loans more expensive. Thus, moral hazard pushes financial 
asset prices to artificially high levels, which prove to be 
unsustainable. 
2. Tolerating Default and Reckless Lending 
There is a perverse incentive in the operation of subprime mort-
gage markets: Lenders identify and solicit borrowers who have a good 
chance of not repaying the obligation.97 In fact, the profitability of the 
94. See Baher, supra note 62, at 316-18. 
95. See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916, 934 
(1998). 
96. See Howard Lax, et aI., Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic Effi-
ciency, 15 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 533, 556-569 (2004) (concluding that subprime 
lending is inefficient compared to prime lending by evaluating the role of the risk, 
borrower satisfaction with mortgage product and interest rate comparison); 
Vikas Bajaj, Prospering in an Implosion; Subprime Market's Fall Plays to the 
Strengths ofa Bold Contrarian, NY TIMES, Apr. 12,2007, at Cl. See also Alan M. 
White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL'y 
REV. 233 (2002) (recommending policy changes to the contract principle-the 
duty to read). 
97. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and 
Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 249, 257-260, 264 (1997) (drawing a correlation 
between a lender's tolerance ofincreasing default rate and the lender's profitabil-
ity). This phenomenon was even recognized by the bankruptcy courts in the 
United States. See, e.g., In re American Home Patient, Inc., 420 F.3d 559, 
569-570 (6th Cir. 2005) (invalidating interest rate because it would result in a 
windfall to the lender); Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (cramdown 
2008] THE NEED FOR UNIFORM BROKER REGULATION 759 
loan portfolio depends on defaulting borrowers. In a competitive mar-
ket, it is rational for lenders to have a portfolio of non-performing, 
high-interest rates loans. Lending to borrowers who are likely to de-
fault can go beyond equilibrium and extend to a profitable transaction 
so long as the fees received by the lender exceed the cost of writing off 
the principa1.98 
Lenders are well aware that the loans that they make are both 
excessive, meaning the borrower does not have the ability to repay, 
and reckless, meaning that the lender is conscious of but disregards 
the financial consequences to the borrower when the loan is made. 
Borrower behavior and literacy are not at the crux of these problems 
nor should solutions be predicated on them.99 
The repayment plan of the mortgages indicates that they are im-
properly made. Instead of the principal reducing, it increases. The 
high rate of foreclosure also indicates that mortgage loans have not 
been properly made. Receiving a subprime loan with certain features, 
especially predatory ones, portends delinquency, with the likelihood of 
foreclosure increasing over time. lOO 
Foreclosure involves negative externalities.1o1 As in personal 
bankruptcy, foreclosure is not a 'fully isolated' internalized occurrence 
interest rate should be based on an efficient market); In re Hernandez, 208 B.R. 
872, 879 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) (discussing Sears payment plan that calculated 
finance charges for non-payment as profitable). 
98. This unorthodox business principal called the "sweatbox," refers to identifying 
customers who will be unable to pay debt and allowing them to 'sweat-out' their 
inability to pay until they finally default. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Re-
form and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375. With 
payment of interest, late fee payments, penalty interest fees and re-financing, 
non-performing loans can be maintained to a "break-even" period. 
99. John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 405, 407 (proposing an affirmative legal defense of "reckless credit" for 
bankruptcy debtors to assert against undesirable loan contracts in response to 
bankruptcy reform legislation that is too onerous on borrowers). Most scholars 
are critical of the actual impact financial literacy education can cause. See, e.g., 
Susan Block-Lieb, Net Mandatory Protections as Veiled Punishments: Debtor Edi-
cation in H.R. 975, The Bankruptcy Abuse and Prevention Act of 2003, 69 BROOK. 
L. REV. 425 (2004); Creola Johnson, Maxed out College Students: A Call To Limit 
Credit Card Solicitations on College Campuses, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PuB. POL'y 
191 (2005); Nathalie Martin & Ocean Tama y Sweet, Mind Games: Rethinking 
BAPCPA's Debtor Education Provisions, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 517 (2007). 
100. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. 04-280, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL 
AND STATE AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING, RE-
PORT TO THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER 254 (2004) (statement of 
Scott Harshbarger, Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Massachusetts) (Predatory 
lending practices targeting low-income neighborhoods may result in "the social 
fabric of many inner-city urban neighborhoods [being) torn apart and communi-
ties destablized."), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf. 
101. Externalities generally refer to third party factors that effect outcomes. A nega-
tive externality in social economics terms is an outcome that is not socially opti-
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between a home buyer and a lender. Bankruptcy scholars identify two 
factors which make up the "knock-on effect."102 Both factors capture 
the psychological costs of debt in monetizable costS.103 One factor 
evaluates the effect of bankruptcy debt on the debtors family and 
friends and the other on society and the debtor's inefficiency at work 
while under financial strain.104 
Two troubling attributes of the subprime market contribute to 
borrower irrationally and may lead to foreclosure. The first is the bor-
rower's cognitive bias for risk underestimation. lo5 Generally, bor-
rower behavior has been characterized as irrational when the end-cost 
of the loan seems unreasonably high.106 Brokers' selection of irra-
tional borrowers in turn fuels the foreclosure rates in the subprime 
mortgages. Borrowers irrationally agree to repay unserviceable levels 
of debt simply because they cannot appreciate the nature of the obliga-
tion. We are witness to the fall-out of this now as borrowers are no 
longer able to refinance and lenders go under.107 
The second troubling attribute that compounds borrowing irration-
ally is the lender's credit risk assessment, or ability to repay. The 
pricing structure of many subprime loans is complex with variable 
terms. Lenders find themselves in an advantageous position because 
even if the loans default, lenders have received a profitable return of 
interest charges and fees prior to default. The lack of price trans-
parency precludes all but the most financially astute of borrowers 
from making an accurate assessment of the costs of a loan. 
This incentive that lenders have to lend money to borrowers who 
may end up defaulting on their loans is an aberration of the conven-
mal. See generally Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the 
Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355 (2006). 
102. See Pottow, supra note 99, at 411. 
103. Bankruptcy scholars describe these as "intrahousehold" costs. Robert B. Chap-
man, Missing Persons: Social Science and Accounting for Race, Gender, Class, 
and Marriage in Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 347 (2002). 
104. For example, bankrupt debtors are distracted from working at their highest and 
best-use level of productivity because they are trying to cope with financial ruin. 
See Mechelle Dickersen, Bankruptcy and Mortgage Lending: The Homeowner Di· 
lemma, 38 J. MARsHALL L. REV. 19, 49 (2004). 
105. In the credit card industry, "irrational discounting myopia" makes it easy for bor-
rowers to be seduced by plastic. See Pottow, supra note 99, at 413. For a general 
overview, see Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Ap· 
proach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Oren Bar-Gill, Se-
duction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1396-99 (2004) (discussing credit 
cards). 
106. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and 
Market Corrections, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (2006). 
107. Many subprime loans require frequent re-financing in order for borrowers to 
meet the monthly payments. Michael J. Pyle, Policy Comment, A "Flip" Look at 
Predatory Lending: Will the Fed's Revised Regulation Z End Abusive Refinancing 
Practices?, 112 Yale L.J. 1919, 1923-24 (2003). 
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tional paradigm of credit risk assessment. What is most significant 
about the financing of subprime loans is the locus of the long-term 
lending obligation. Traditionally, lending institutions have an inter-
est in the performance of the loan because it remains a part of the 
institution's portfolio. By contrast, the current business model of sell-
ing the loan creates a disincentive at the time of origination and en-
courages recklessness on the part of lenders. 
The rationale of perfect information would dictate that the bor-
rower make a decision not to accept the loan because it would be ap-
parent that its terms would lead to default. lOS What happens, 
especially in the adjustable rate mortgage ("ARM") market, is a prac-
tice that Professor Pottow describes as the "sweat box" in the con-
sumer lending market. In this practice, 
[Llenders lure debtors into their sweatbox ... by preying upon their underes-
timation and optimism biases. "Shrouding" the terms of their contracts 
through moving price terms, the lenders attract borrowers-"manipulating" 
them, in the assessment of some psycho-economic observers-who likely can-
not repay their debts and hence will be the most likely to sweat. The sweat-
box is actually a two-stage model that entices all borrowers at the outset with 
low rates, but then cranks up the heat through late payment fees and penalty 
rates for the "sweaters."109 
In essence, the costs of excessive credit is borne entirely by borrow-
ers who mayor may not be financially literate, but who are surely 
confused and sometimes manipulated. 110 A market response that 
eliminates subprime lending completely is inappropriate because 
there are legitimate needs.111 A market response that ignores the 
reckless actors, is irresponsible to the extent that it relies solely on 
market assumptions about the borrower rationality and information. 
108. Economist Kenneth Arrow identified five criteria that any social choice should 
meet. The criteria were: (i) transitivity; (ii) unrestricted domain; (iii) the Pareto 
principle; (iv) independence of irrelevant alternatives; and (v) non-dictatorship. 
See KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963). 
109. Pottow, supra note 99 at 417. Social efficiency from a positivist perspective evalu-
ates desirability or undesirability of a phenomenon by evaluating data according 
to the established criteria. For a general discussion of positivist economic theory 
see AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 56 (K Arrow, et 
aI., eds. 1970); W. J. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE 
STATE (1952); J. Baumol, Community Indifference, 14 REV. ECON. STUD. 44, 47 
(1947). 
110. Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit: Preserv-
ing the Social Safety Net of Informality in Small-loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1217, 1253-57 (2004) (discussing how the informal economy affects minority 
borrower behavior and advocating that credit democratization, particularly ef-
forts to curb predatory lending take into account the cultural background of 
borrowers). 
111. Joseph A. Smith, Jr., The Federal Banking Agencies' Guidance on Subprime 
Lending: Regulation with a Divided Mind, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 73 (2002) (dis-
cussing the banking regulatory agencies' efforts to define responsible subprime 
lending). 
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A transparent and price able credit product that will allow consumers 
to make informed choices about their credit levels-and, thus, only 
use "good," economy-growing credit-is needed.112 
A more comprehensive regulatory scheme of mortgage brokers 
serves as a deterrence to "bad" conduct. It also corrects a structural 
market defect in the way that mortgages are presently originated. In 
this context, establishing a mortgage brokers' fiduciary duty to a bor-
rower places the liability on the party who benefits from an abusive 
extension of credit and therefore ought to bear responsibility for the 
borrower's injury.113 
3. The Market as a Social Actor: A Symbiotic Synthesis 
An unusually high foreclosure rate in the subprime market and the 
loss of home ownership for first-time homeowners represents an insti-
tutional change to the pattern of increased home ownership. It also 
destroys the beginnings of financial foundations for wealth 
accumulation. 
Viewing the harm of mortgage foreclosure, or even delinquency, 
from the perspective of the borrower is consistent with a social institu-
tions economic theory. This perspective challenges the neoclassical ec-
onomic notions of the market as being based on a universal model of 
rational behavior.114 Instead the question becomes how this economic 
sector should provide for human needs.115 A social institution analy-
sis evaluates the different components of the market to address the 
current issue: What is an acceptable rate of foreclosure in the sub-
prime market116 and who should bear the costs of growth and pros-
112. Again, there are parallels from Professor Mann's work on consumer credit-card 
debt. See RoNALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD: THE GROWTH AND REGULATION OF 
PAYMENT CARD MARKETS ARoUND THE WORLD 80--81 (2006). 
113. The structural inequity of subprime lending becomes even more evident when 
bankruptcy is the only option for subprime borrowers. The bankruptcy conse-
quences for subprime residential mortgages can differ than for prime mortgages. 
The result is again a loss of equity. See generally R. Stephen Painter Jr., Sub-
prime Lending, Suboptimal Bankruptcy: A Proposal to Amend §§ 522(f)(1)(B) and 
548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code to Protect Subprime Mortgage Borrowers and 
Their Unsecured Creditors, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 81 (2006) (arguing in favor of 
amendments to the bankruptcy code that will give subprime borrowers the same 
"fresh start" as prime borrowers). 
114. See Peter J. Boettke, Where Did Economics Go Wrong? Modern Economics as a 
Flight from Reality, 11 CRITICAL REV. 11, 16 (1997). 
115. This theory of economic social institutions has its roots in Karl Polanyi, an econo-
mist who studied the effect of social relationships and institutions. See generally 
KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944). 
116. Analysis of what an acceptable foreclosure rate should be is outside the scope of 
this paper. What is most significant in evaluating foreclosure statistics in the 
subprime market is that what seems like a low foreclosure rate 2.65%, represents 
an increase of 80% over a similar reporting period in 2006. See Press Release, 
Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, Delinquencies and Foreclosures in Latest MBA Na-
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perity of this particular financial innovation. From the borrower's 
perspective, democratization of credit argues for participation in a ro-
bust economy by attaining exclusive property rights through home 
ownership.117 Yet, that perspective also argues for a dramatically 
smaller foreclosure rate than is presently projected. 
Social institutions theory as applied in an economic context catego-
rizes and orders social interactions based on "non-economic" relation-
ships and institutions.118 As a result, decisions are social actions and 
not solely classical economic ones. Similarly, economic institutions 
are social forms. The relationships and intersections of the institu-
tional players are examined to see how change is effected.119 
Social economic institutions theory can translate into a concept of 
economic democracy. As such, there is a recognition of the economic 
rights of all who participate in the economy. Socio-economic decision 
making, based on equitable factors that fairly distribute control, dis-
counts the notion of property rights as being exclusive. 120 In particu-
lar, the tangible economic interests represented by economic property 
rights directly relates to the distribution of property.121 The market, 
tional Delinquency Survey (Dec. 6,2007), available at http://www.mortgagebank-
ers.org/NewsanciMedia/PressCenter/58758.htm. 
Social choice or social institutions economic theory has four predominate fac-
tors: 1) encourages and facilitates cooperation; 2) defines entitlements or prop-
erty interests that may be the subjects of exchange; 3) protects participants 
against predation, including from the state and 4) imposes accountability. Wil-
liam K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545 (1994). 
117. See Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L. J. 1477, 1481 (2005) (describing connection between property and eco-
nomic rights). 
118. See generally Peter J. Hammer, Arrow's Analysis of Social Institutions: Entering 
the Marketplace with Giving Hands?, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & L. 1081 (2001) 
(discussing Kenneth Arrow's theory on the role of social institutions in economic 
theory). 
119. Philosopher John Rawls is instructive on this point. Rawls posits that distribu-
tive justice requires that society maximize the life prospects of its least ad-
vantaged class. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
120. Profesor Stiglitz has teamed up with several economists and presents several dif-
ferent theorems that are relevant to this discussion. The Sappington-Stiglitz the-
orem "establishes that an ideal government could do better running an enterprise 
itself than it could through privatization. See David E. M. Sappington & Joseph 
E. Stiglitz, Privitization, Information and Incentives, 6 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 567, 579-80 (1986). The Greenwald-Stiglitz theorem posits market fail-
ure as the norm, establishing "that government could potentially almost always 
improve upon the market's resource allocation." Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Examining Alternative Macroeconomic Theories, 1988 BROOKINGS PA-
PERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 207, 211-34. 
121. KENNETH J. ARROW, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to 
the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allocation, in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS OF 
KENNETH J.-GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 133, 149 (1983) (discussing Arrow's well-
know examples of opportunistic behavior such as "adverse selection" and "moral 
hazard"). 
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therefore, does not operate outside the context of the individuals who 
participate in it. To do otherwise is to subordinate the interests of 
some of the market participants.122 
The subprime mortgage market, and the predatory mortgage mar-
ket, in particular, represent a market transformation.123 A critique of 
the organizational arrangement in which the subprime market oper-
ates shows that it is devoid of adequate oversight and regulatory au-
thority.124 It is chaotic in some respects.125 Given that the subprime 
housing market operates solely to serve credit-impaired borrowers, it 
is inconceivable to allow it to operate without protections. The advent 
of subprime lending for home finance occurred without significant 
study of the impact of institutions on patterns of behavior and habit. 
It also developed with merely indirect governmental support and over-
sight.126 The justifications for home ownership in this industry merit 
the same incentives and support as in the prime markets. 
As a by-product of the transformed institution, the evaluation of 
borrower behavior must be measured against the market's pricing 
strategies. By necessity, that evaluation focuses scrutiny on the be-
havior of the brokers, lenders, and the rating agencies and begs, as a 
matter of equity, for more regulatory oversight. The absence of suffi-
cient regulatory involvement and authority abdicates the spirit, if not 
the letter, of the law. A uniform standard must apply across the en-
tire home mortgage industry. While the market should not be over-
regulated, presently there is an absence of regulation. It is contrary to 
public interest to rely on the voluntary acts of brokers, lenders, and 
the rating agencies alone to achieve a market correction. An interven-
tion is necessary to address the issues that are keeping the industry 
from working efficiently and fairly.127 That intervention requires 
evaluating the federalism issues unique to banking law. 
122. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE 
FOR THE HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET 205-14 (2004) (arguing that high-cost lend-
ing has adverse spill-over effects on the economy). 
123. Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of 
Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431 (1996). 
124. See, e.g., Peter J. Hammer, Questioning Traditional Antitrust Presumptions: 
Price and Non·Price Competition in Hospital Markets, 32 MICH. J. L. REFORM 727 
(1999) (identifYing market imperfections and legitimate professional goals in reg-
ulating trade restraints in healthcare). 
125. Chaos theory is described as a system that goes from predictable to unpredictable 
behavior. See Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and Co-Evolution: The Web 
of Law, Management Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66 
TENN. L. REV. 137,268 (1998). 
126. See generally Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-spon-
sored Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 565 (2005) (criticizing the federal policies and 
statutes that regulate government-sponsored enterprises as providing for no 
accountability). 
127. David K. Musto & Nicholas Souleles, A Portfolio View of Consumer Credit (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 05-25, 2005) (examining risk-
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III. MORTGAGE BROKERS-THE CORRECTIVE FRAMEWORK 
Most states regulate mortgage brokers.l28 However, most of these 
statutes are not effective in eliminating subprime lending abuse be-
cause they do not impose an affirmative duty on the mortgage bro-
ker.129 Fiduciary obligations to the borrowers, and not just the 
lenders, should be imposed upon the mortgage brokers. 
The question of equity in regulation raises issues about the inter-
play of the state and federal governments. That question came more 
to the forefront after the Supreme Court's decision in Watters v. Wa-
chovia.l30 By upholding the Office of the Comptroller of Currency's 
("OCC") preemption of state consumer laws, the Supreme Court's rul-
ing contributed to an ongoing debate about banking and federalism. 
This section provides the corrective framework for Watters, first by 
discussing federalism's three chief tenets-preemption, dual federal-
ism and cooperative federalism-and concludes by recommending co-
operative federalism as an approach that strikes the appropriate 
balance between federal oversight of an issue of national importance 
and state regulation of an issue that "quintessentially belongs to the 
states. "131 
This section then examines fiduciary duties and argues that they 
are at the crux of the current problem of regulating the misbehavior of 
mortgage brokers. It discusses the dual agency situation that mort-
gage brokers find themselves in, representing the interest of both bor-
rowers and lenders. It also examines how the standard mortgage 
broker agreement waives the mortgage broker's fiduciary duty to the 
borrower and the implied duty of good faith is insufficient to protect 
borrowers. It ends by proposing a federal approach for regulating 
mortgage brokers that balances state and federal interests and serves 
as a control on the opportunistic behavior of mortgage brokers. 
adjusted consumer credit), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/files/wps/2005/wp 
05-25.pdf. 
128. Although forty-nine states require mortgage brokers and mortgage brokerage in-
stitutions to have licenses, other requirements are minimal. See Wilson, supra 
note 19, at 301. 
129. Only Minnesota and North Carolina a statutory fiduciary duty on mortgage bro-
kers. See, e.g., Lawrence Hansen, In Brokers We Trust-Mortgage Licensing Stat-
utes Address Predatory Lending, 14 AB.AJ. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY 
DEV. L. 332 (2004) (discussing the mortgage broker license statutes in New York, 
Georgia, and Illinois). 
130. Watters v. Wachovia, 127 S.Ct. 1559 (2007). 
131. Id. at 1573 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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A. Banking Law and Federalism 
Dual federalism separates the power and authority of the state and 
federal government. l32 The Nation's banking system was envisioned 
as a system in which federal and state regulation would operate sepa-
rately.l33 In theory, state and federal banking regulators operate in 
distinct spheres. In practice, federal and state banking regulation co-
exist with cooperation between the regulators. l34 States have the au-
thority to enact laws in certain subject areas that federally-chartered 
institutions must follow. l35 Yet, federalism in banking law raises the 
unique issue of whether the federal regulator's policy of expanding 
banking powers deregulates federally chartered institutions, thus 
making it difficult for state-chartered institutions to remain competi-
tive. l36 In particular, the issue evolves to ask whether this expansion 
of powers for national banks and the federal doctrine of preemption 
132. The U.S. Supreme Court first expressed the doctrine of dual federalism in Texas 
v. White, 74 U.S. (1 Wall) 700, 725 (1869), overruled in part by Morgan v. United 
States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885). The doctrine has three related principles: 
(1) the federal government and the state governments exercise exclusive 
and nonoverlapping authority; (2) the allocation of authority between 
the national government and the states rests on functional premises, 
with the national government regulating certain kinds of matters and 
the state governments regulating different matters; and (3) the courts 
play an important and distinctive role in maintaining the boundary be-
tween the states and the national government. 
Robert A. Schapiro, Interactive Federalism: Filling the Gaps? From Dualist Fed-
eralism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (2006); see also Ernest A. 
Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Excep-
tion, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 144 (2001) (defining dual federalism as a sub-
species of dual sovereignty with state and federal governments having different 
jurisdictional spheres). 
133. See generally Stephen J. Friedman & Connie M. Friesen, A New Paradigm for 
Financial Regulation: Getting from Here to There, 43 MD L. REV. 413 (1984) (dis-
cussing the history of banking regulation). 
134. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Re-
sponse, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1133, 1159-1161 (1990). Cf, Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum-Out of 
Many, One: Why the United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 
U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 1 (2005). Federalism concerns arise in most areas oflaw, 
including commercial law. See generally E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Forward, Federal-
ism or Uniformity of Commercial Law, 11 RUTGERS L.J. 527 (1980); Neil B. Cohen 
& Barry L. Zaretsky, Drafting Commercial Law for the New Millennium: Will the 
Current Process Suffice? 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 551 (1993). 
135. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards 
of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 220 (2000) (posits that contract law is an 
area of state law-making); William J. Woodard, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: 
Shielding Local Law and Those it Protects From Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 
40 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 9 (2006). 
136. Christian A. Johnson, Wild Card Statutes, Parity, and National Banks-the Re-
nascence of State Banking Powers, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 351 (1995) (advocating 
that state legislatures expand state banking powers in order to make state banks 
more competitive with national banks). 
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facilitates the gaps in the current regulatory structure that have al-
lowed subprime lending to both proliferate and become harmful.137 
1. Federal Preemption 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress 
the power to preempt any state law within its constitutionally dele-
gated powers. l3S Congress' intent to preempt state law may be either 
implied or express. l39 Moreover, Congress may delegate to adminis-
trative agencies the power to enact regulations that preempt state law 
as well. l40 
Express preemption requires an examination of both Congress' 
specific intention as well as the scope of the statute.l4l When the lan-
guage is clear, Congress' intent is straightforward. Rarely, is the stat-
ute unambiguous and the scope precise. Instead, the court must 
reconcile the specific statutory language with the legislative history 
and surrounding circumstances. More often than not, a court will ac-
knowledge the law's varying interpretations and will have to deter-
137. This Article does not describe the current state and federal law and regulations 
that may apply to subprime lending because there are many excellent articles 
that do so. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending; 
Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1,4 (2005). 
There are 10 federal laws and five federal agencies that have some type of 
jurisdiction over consumer lending. The FTC has brought nineteen actions alleg-
ing deceptive and/or illegal practices on the part of mortgage lenders from 1983-
2000 under Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). TILA was the first mejor Congres-
sional effort at regulating consumer credit transactions. TILA requires the credi-
tor to disclose the amount financed, the annual percentage rate, the finance 
charge, and the total number of payments to be made, including a payment 
schedule. Most of these cases resulted in settlement and concession and promis-
sory obligation form the offending lenders. See Donald C. Lampe, Predatory 
Lending Initiatives, Legislation and Litigation; Federal Regulation, State Law 
and Preemption, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 78 (2002). 
138. U.S. CaNsT. art. VI, cl. 2. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
451 U.S. at 746 (1819). 
139. Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm; Conceptual and Interpre-
tive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1165 (1998). See also Nina A. Mendelson, 
Chevron and Preemption, 102 Mich L. Rev. 737 (2004) (discussing the role offed-
eral administrative agencies and preemption of state law). 
140. See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 162 (1982). 
141. Bates v. Dow Agro Sciences, Inc., 544 U.S. 431,453-58 (2005). A mejority of the 
Court decided that a federal statute did not preempt state tort law on labeling 
pesticides. Justice Stevens was particularly forceful in defining the limitations 
on the scope of preemption. 
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mine the scope or range of the statute.142 The foundational question 
is always to what extent Congress intended to preempt state law.143 
When courts cannot find express preemption, they will look for im-
plied preemption.144 Courts evaluating implied preemption evaluate 
whether the federal interest in the subject matter is of such signifi-
cantly high interest that state regulation should be supplanted.145 
This calls for the court to make a more probing analysis of the stat-
ute's purpose and goals and then to balance the statute's objectives 
with the state laws on the subject matter.146 Courts may also evalu-
ate whether the state rule operates as an obstacle to federal occupa-
tion of a subject matter area. This examination evaluates the effect of 
a combined federal and state approach to see if it will be impossible to 
accommodate both.147 The impediment of a state law to accomplish-
ing the federal statutory objectives is also evaluated.148 
Recognizing that both the state and federal governments operate 
on a delicate balancing of authority, the Supreme Court has carved 
out exclusive state authority on some issues. Absent a clear and man-
ifest purpose by Congress, these issues are left to the states.149 In the 
subprime lending context, preemption questions have arisen regard-
ing whether the acc's regulations on visitation and preemption pro-
142. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.s. 861, 894 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Justice Stevens dissented because the source of the federal government's preemp-
tive authority was an administrative agency's interim rule. 
143. Robert R. Gasaway, The Problem of Federal Preemption: Reformulating the Black 
Letter Rules, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 25 (2005) (arguing that courts should interpret 
express preemption provisions very broadly). 
144. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002) ("Congress' inclusion of an 
express pre-emption clause 'does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-
emption principles.'" (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 869)). 
145. M. Stuart Madden, Federal Preemption of Inconsistent State Safety Obligations, 
21 PACE L. REV. 103, 106 (2000) ("Issues of express preemption are textual, while 
questions of implied preemption are contextual."). 
146. This is field preemption and applies in the cases between OCC and the states. 
See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
147. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (discuss-
ing impossibility and preemption); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) 
(discussing obstacles and preemption). 
148. For example, HOEPA's prohibition against a higher interest rate on default in a 
HOEPA high-cost loan, "preempts state law to the extent that state law is more 
tolerant than the federal requirements for loans covered by HOEPA." Julia Pat-
terson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Pre-
emption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1346 (2006). 
149. Only those state laws that conflict with the purpose of national banks or that 
impair the ability of national banks to execute their purpose are invalidated. See 
generally First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924); McClellan v. 
Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 357 (1896) (federal law prevails over state in the banking 
law arena when there is a conflict); Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 
(1896). An example is the statute which expressly preempts state usury laws, the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 
("DIDMCA"), 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (2000). 
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hibit state regulation. Three circuit courts and the Supreme Court 
considered this issue and affirmed that the OCC properly exercised its 
authority. 150 
2. Watters v. Wachovia151 
The dynamic between state and federal regulation was tested re-
cently in the Watters v. Wachovia case. Whether federally chartered 
financial institutions are subject to the enforcement of state laws 
raises issues of federalism. In May 2007, the Supreme Court refused 
to uphold a Michigan law permitting state banking regulators to in-
vestigate consumer complaints about banking practices. The Court 
decided that federal banking regulations preempt a state's authority 
to regulate the lending activities of federally-chartered bank subsidi-
aries, such as mortgage companies. The ruling is but a single exam-
ple ofthe kind offederal action that may thwart the efforts of states to 
protect consumers from abusive lending that may occur within their 
borders. 152 
In Watters, the Supreme Court upheld a regulation of the federal 
banking agency, the OCC, preempting state law regulatory authority 
over national banks and their subsidiaries. 153 Opponents of Watters, 
and more specifically of the OCC's preemption powers, argue that the 
Court's decision impermissibly threatens the dual banking system 
and fosters an uneven playing field between federal and state 
150. The Sixth, Ninth, and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that the OCC, 
as an administrative agency, did not exceed its authority to exercise jurisdiction 
over operating subsidiaries. See Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th 
Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949, 960 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 321 (2d Cir. 2005). As one scholar 
has said, the question is not "whether the OCC is authorized to preempt state 
predatory lending statutes, but rather on the normative issue as to whether the 
OCC should preempt state predatory lending laws." Julia Patterson Forrester, 
Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and Fed-
erally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CrN. L. REV. 1303, 1348-49 (2006). 
151. 127 S.Ct. 1559 (2007). 
152. For example, in Illinois where foreclosure filings totaled 72,445, increasing 55% 
in 2006, the state created a Predatory Lending Database that monitors unscrupu-
lous lending practices. See 765 ILL. COMPo STAT. 77170 (2007). The same legisla-
tion also regulates the conduct of mortgage brokers. The law limits the types of 
loans mortgage brokers may offer their clients by requiring a suitability-type 
test. The law requires that mortgage brokers verify the borrower's ability to re-
pay not just the principle and interest, but also the insurance and taxes. Mort-
gage brokers are also under a duty to guide potential borrowers through loan 
comparisons. [d. Georgia has implemented a similar plan. Gary Whalen, The 
Wealth Effects of aee Preemption Announcements After the Passage of the Geor-
gia Fair Lending Act, (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Econ. & Pol'y 
Analysis Working Paper 2004-4, 2004). 
153. Watters, 127 S.Ct. 1559. 
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chartered mortgage subsidiaries. 154 Additionally, as argued below, 
the Court's decision to uphold the acc's regulations compromises con-
sumer protection laws, which are usually enforced by the states.155 
The issue was whether Michigan's mortgage licensing laws applied 
to national banks and their subsidiaries operating within the state of 
Michigan.156 Specifically, Wachovia challenged the authority of the 
State of Michigan to regulate its operating subsidiary, which was 
chartered under state law.157 The Michigan law at issue permitted 
the state to investigate a consumer complaint if federal regulators re-
fused to investigate the complaint. It also imposed fees and required 
they register with the state. It required operating subsidiaries of na-
tional banks to register with the state regulators and gave the regula-
tors the authority to "visit" and examine the national bank operating 
subsidiaries and bring enforcement actions, if necessary, for violations 
of state law. 158 
Wachovia successfully argued that preemption protects the charac-
ter of national banks and a system of nationwide banking by shielding 
the banks from conflicting state laws that impede or interfere with 
their functioning. The Supreme Court also agreed with Wachovia that 
under the visitorial powers, states may exercise jurisdiction in certain 
subject areas over national banks only when Congress by permission 
allows. 159 The acc characterized its regulations as offering greater 
clarity to existing restrictions that limit a state's regulatory power 
over national banks and their operating subsidiaries.16o The agency 
154. The Supreme Court's upholding of the OCC's broad interpretation of its authority 
fails to take into account the OCC's inherent conflict of interest. Professor AI-
thur Wilmarth has written the preeminent article discussing the conflict and the 
unfair advantage that the OCC's jurisdiction creates for subsidiaries of national 
banks. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The acc's Preemption Rules Exceed the 
Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and 
Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2004). 
155. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
156. The Court's decision upheld the favorable decisions in other circuits. See Wacho-
via Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556(6th Cir. 2005); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 
414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005). 
157. On Jan. 1,2003, Wachovia Mortgage became a wholly-owned operating subsidi-
ary of Wachovia Bank, a national bank. Chartered by the state, an operating 
subsidiary is a separate corporation from the national bank, but under federal 
law, it can engage in the same business practices, including mortgage lending. 
On April 3, 2003, after making mortgage loans in Michigan for nearly six years, 
Wachovia Mortgage notified the Michigan Office of Financial and Insurance Ser-
vices ("OFIS") that it would continue to issue mortgages without registering with 
the OFIS, thereby violating Michigan's laws. Watters, 127 S.Ct. At 1565-66. 
158. Two OCC regulations were at issue in Watters. They were 0) the preemption of 
state laws available to national banks and their operating subsidiaries and (2) 
the OCC's visitorial powers over national banks and their operating subsidiaries. 
159. [d. at 1571. 
160. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 46119-02 (Aug. 2, 2003) (Codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 34). 
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interpreted the passage of diverse local and state laws aimed at na-
tional banks as both interfering with the operations of national banks 
and imposing unnecessary costs and expenses. In formulating its pre-
emption rule, the OCC used as a criterion whether the state law will 
"obstruct, impair, or condition" national banks and therefore imper-
missibly limit the exercise of federally authorized powers. The OCC 
based its exemptions on those laws which regulate the business of 
banking as compared with those laws which govern the conduct of 
banking business. lSI Consumer groups opposing the OCC's regula-
tions were concerned that the regulations exempted national banks 
from state and local laws against predatory lending. The OCC as-
serted its authority to determine predatory lending violations and to 
regulate such abusive conduct under its supervision and enforcement 
powers. IS2 
These recent developments necessitate reform in the regulatory 
structure to protect responsible subprime lending. It is arguable 
whether the OCC has properly exercised either its preemptive or visi-
torial powers. Even without preemption, states would have difficulty 
enforcing anti-predatory lending statutes because of OCC's regula-
tions on visitorial powers. The real policy question is whether the 
OCC, which denies that its banks are involved in predatory lending, 
ought to preempt state predatory lending laws. 
3. Cooperative Federalism 
While both dual federalism and preemption serve their purpose in 
the various contexts,IS3 there is an alternative middle ground of coop-
erative federalism. Cooperative federalism is more appropriate in this 
context because it advances the doctrine of state and local government 
autonomy but requires consistency and allows federal intervention 
when necessary.IS4 
161. Watters, 127 S.Ct. at 1569-71. 
162. DCC's new regulation did not change the obligation of national banks and their 
operating subsidiaries to be subject to applicable federal law prohibiting unfair or 
deceptive practices in lending activities under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act (FTC Act). 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(c) & 34.3 (2007). 
163. Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal·local Collaboration in an Era 
of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 964-68 (2007) (comparing preemption 
and cooperative federalism). 
164. Cooperative federalism as a regulatory structure covers a wide terrain of fields 
including environmental programs, telecommunications regulation, health care 
programs and tobacco regulation. Its benefits, generally described as "demo-
cratic experimentalism" have four basic categories: (1) state interests and auton-
omy; (2) local participation and accountability in public policies; (3) local 
experimentation and interstate competition; and (4) using local, already estab-
lished bureaucracy. Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Tele· 
communications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1,31 (1999). 
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Cooperative federalism is characterized by a strong federal govern-
ment with reliance on the state and local governments to work cooper-
atively to implement programs. It has two basic structures of 
operation. One is receipt of federal aid when conditions are met by 
non-federal bodies.l65 The other is conditional preemption by estab-
lishing a minimum federal standard that non-federal governments 
must meet in order to regulate a subject matter area reserved for the 
federal government. The most common cooperative federalism struc-
ture combines the two: Congress preempts an area of regulation and 
subsidizes state and local governments to implement the federal pro-
grams if they meet federal standards.166 
AB a regulatory tool, cooperative federalism melds the competing 
interests. It is a method of federal intervention that forces states to 
address their inconsistencies without requiring a homogeneous ap-
proach.167 It also rejects exclusive reliance on federal courts and 
agencies by allowing states to become more autonomous as adminis-
trators of federal law.l68 In the area of economic regulation, the 
shared schematic provides a workable model that balances the goals of 
regulation with the concerns of business looking for the proper bal-
ance.169 Unlike dual federalism, in which there are few or no con-
straints in state program frameworks, and preemption, in which 
165. Both state and local governments playa role in implementing federal standards. 
See generally Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 V AND. L. REV. 1485, 
1488 (1994) (discussing federalism as sharing power between state local and fed-
eral governments). 
166. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 IiARv. J.L. & 
PuB. POL'y 181,185-86 (1998). Mills describes this as the "carrot and stick" ap-
proach of cooperative federalism. The "carrot" is when Congress in effect hires 
non-federal governmental bodies to implement federal government programs by 
giving them federal grants but the federal assistance is conditioned on the imple-
menting entities meeting specific program requirements. The "stick" is condi-
tional preemption. Using this approach, Congress creates a federal standard and 
allows state or local law that is consistent with the minimal federal threshold to 
replace the federal regulation. Id. 
167. For example, in the area of welfare reform, which involves federal benefit and 
entitlement programs, state and local initiatives are needed. See Sheryll D. 
Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the 
Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552 (1999); Michele Estrin 
Gilman, Poverty and Communitarnism: Towards a Community·Based Welfare 
System, 66, U. PI'IT. L. REV. 721 (2005). 
168. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforce-
ment of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1693 (2001). 
169. The use of cooperative federalism in economic regulation is a very popular notion. 
See Reza Dibadj, Weasel Numbers, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1325 (2006); Jill E. Fisch, 
The New Federal Regulation of Corporate Governance, 28 IiARv. J.L. & PuB. 
POL'y 39 (2004); Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street in Turmoil: State-Federal Rela-
tions Post· Eliot Spitzer, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 117 (2004); Jill E. Fisch, Institutional 
Competition to Regulate Corporations: A Comment on Macey, 55 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 617, 625 (2005); Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooper· 
ation and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 122 (2004). 
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there is a unitary uniform federal framework, there is what some 
might term a "healthy" separation of powers.170 
Cooperative federalism envisions a sharing of regulatory authority 
between the federal government. States have the authority to regu-
late within a framework delineated by federal law. 171 State agencies 
may supervise regulatory programs that implement federallaw. 172 
While the federal government has a broader constituency, greater 
resources, and a national perspective on social and economic concerns, 
states focus on local or regional concerns.173 They also can experi-
ment with innovations and may try ideas that can later be imple-
mented nationally.174 States may also implement programs that are 
too risky for the federal government to attempt initially. The shared 
functions create an appropriate tension and have proven to be an ap-
propriate allocation of power and resources. 175 
This is very similar to what has been done in the area of environ-
mental law. Congress sets parameters by passing environmental laws 
that apply to all of the states. States then have the flexibility to adopt 
programs that are more comprehensive with the EPA intervening only 
if the federal minimum standards are not met. The federal environ-
mental goals are set through federal legislation requiring minimum 
federal standards. The programs are then delegated to the states, re-
flecting the "retention of the traditional notions offederalism."176 The 
national goal of providing fair lending throughout the home mortgage 
market can prove beneficial and balanced within federalist principles. 
The advantage offederal oversight is national uniformity and the abil-
ity to monitor abuse and non-compliance while also clarifying the fed-
eral priorities. The disadvantage of this approach is that there can be 
170. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why 
State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
813, 852 (1998) (positing that the reality of state and federal authority being com-
pletely separate and distinct is a flawed premise). 
171. See generally Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 
557 (2000). 
172. This period of burgeoning federal programs represented a significant change in 
state and federal government relations and required a greater deal of cooperation 
for program implementation. A 1938 Iowa Law Review Symposium chronicles 
this period of New Deal legislation and the developing relationship between the 
state and federal governments. See, e.g., Symposium on Cooperative Federalism, 
23 IOWA L. REV. 455 (1938). 
173. Ellen R. Zahren, Comment, Overfiling Under Federalism: Federal Nipping at 
State Heels to Protect The Environment, 49 EMORY L.J. 373, (2000). 
174. Michael Abramowicz, Speeding up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 
157-59 (2003) (discussing the benefits of innovation in the corporate context). 
175. Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Per-
manence Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105, 151-53 (2003) 
(discussing allocation of state and federal authority within the context ofthe "law 
of the union doctrine"). 
176. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 25 (1995). 
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tension between the state and federal governments, or that enforce-
ment can interfere with cooperative federalism. l77 There is a legiti-
mate concern that federal standards may be enforced inconsistently or 
become confused with the involvement of state courts. However, with 
most cooperative federalism schemes, implementation and enforce-
ment are effective with the federal oversight. l78 
In operation, the federal banking agencies would retain enforce-
ment jurisdiction. The agencies would approve practices and modify 
state authority when necessary. Challenges to the state's authority 
would be resolved in federal court.l79 It is important, therefore, that 
the federal statute have the proper scope and purpose.l80 
While both dual federalism and preemption serve their purpose in 
the various contexts,l8l the alternative middle of cooperation is appro-
priate in this context. The doctrine advances the doctrine of state and 
local government autonomy, requires consistency, and allows federal 
intervention when necessary.l82 
Central to the imposition of a federalist model under cooperative 
federalism is that the issue be one of national importance that justi-
fies the establishment of federal policy goals. l83 The policy goals of 
federal regulation are paramount. The federal statute becomes impor-
tant in establishing a threshold. By providing minium standards for 
177. Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 191-93, (2005) (discussing the roles of state in environ-
mental enforcement). 
178. See, e.g., Matthew D. Zinno Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Co-
operation, Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81 (2002) ( discussing 
sharing costs as a reason to adopt cooperative federalism standards); George A. 
Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation with Counterpart Agencies Abroad: the FAA's 
Aircraft Certification Experience, 24 L. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 669 (discussing the 
FAA's international cooperative federalism scheme). 
179. For example, in the environmental area, federal courts are called upon to deter-
mine the proper balance in the regulatory environment between the state and 
federal governments. Ellen R. Zahren, Over/iling Under Federalism, 49 EMORY 
L.J. 373, 391-393 (2000). 
180. A federal court would review the challenges to agency authority using a Chevron 
analysis. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 
837,842-45 (1984). 
181. Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-local Collaboration in an Era 
of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 964--68 (2007) (comparing preemption 
and cooperative federalism). 
182. Cooperative federalism as a regulatory structure covers a wide terrain of fields 
including environmental programs, telecommunications regulation, health care 
programs, and tobacco regulation. Its benefits, generally described as "demo-
cratic experimentalism" have four basic categories: (1) state interests and auton-
omy; (2) local participation and accountability in public policies; (3) local 
experimentation and interstate competition; and (4) using local, already estab-
lished bureaucracies. See Weiser, Chevron, supra note 164, at 31. 
183. Uniformity is needed to keep the playing field level and to avoid a "race to the 
bottom." 
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fighting fraud and deceptive actions, a federal statute can also provide 
for both public enforcement and private rights of action. 
Accommodating the interests of the state laws aimed at consumer 
protections is not at odds with this approach. Because this is an area 
that has traditionally been left to the states for regulation, the sharing 
of responsibility may produce the most efficient result for borrowers. 
States have long shown great responsibility and initiative in monitor-
ing consumer activities and passing effective legislation. It is the un-
evenness in states' action to a national problem, however, that calls 
for a modified approach in this area. The problem in this particular 
area is that not all states have taken action. Second, federal preemp-
tion effectively minimizes a great deal of success that state laws have 
achieved in addressing abusive lending practices. Some state legisla-
tures have shown a great deal of initiative in passing effective legisla-
tion. Likewise, state executives have used their resources to bring 
successful actions that halted unfair or deceptive practices and pun-
ished bad actors, and none ofthis has had a negative effect on the flow 
of capital in these jurisdictions. Yet, state laws have still been inef-
fective in their efforts to corral mortgage broker abuse for a number of 
reasons. For instance, the lack of comprehensive coverage has meant 
that the brokers simply avoid making loans in states where there is 
extensive regulation and potentialliability.184 
The new and innovative financial products of the consumer mort-
gage market require a balancing of how to expand access to subprime 
lending while also protecting borrowers from the abuses of a financial 
marketplace. By establishing a federal threshold of fiduciary duty to 
borrowers, minimum federal parameters are set that can be expanded 
as needed to provide enhanced protections. 
B. Fiduciary Duty 
Fiduciary obligation is a context-bound legal obligation based on a 
formally established and recognized agency relationship.185 Agency 
law is fairly simplistic in defining fiduciary duties when the agent has 
expressly decided to act for or on behalf of a principa1.186 Three gener-
184. Neil J. Morse, The Predatory Lending Obstacle Course, MORTGAGE BANKING, Apr. 
2002, at 53-59. 
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). Often a broadly defined concept, 
fiduciary duty has its origins in equity. 
186. See generally FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. 533 (D. Utah 1991) (bank directors 
held liable under standard of gross negligence for lending decisions) (rev'd on 
other grounds); Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979) (finding 
that a fiduciary relationship existed between a service-station owner and an oil 
company that fraudulently induced the service station owner to entering into a 
lease); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding 
francisor liable for violating fiduciary duties to its franchisee); Harold Brown, 
Franchising-A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEX. L. REV. 650 (1971) (discussing 
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ally recognized duties-the duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and the 
duty of good faith-are designed to control opportunistic and abusive 
conduct and are considered to be more than a mere implied contrac-
tual obligation.187 The duty of care requires that the fiduciary con-
sider the appropriate information in making decision's on behalf ofthe 
fiduciary.188 The duty ofloyalty requires that the fiduciary safeguard 
the principal's assets and specifically guard against misappropriation 
of assets that the fiduciary manages or supervises.189 The fiduciary 
duty of good faith-which is distinguished from the implied contrac-
tual term-evaluates whether the fiduciary has taken actions that 
demonstrate a conscious and intentional disregard of risks to the prin-
cipal.19o A violation of anyone of these duties requires the fiduciary 
to be held accountable. The situations in which the duties arise under 
common law may vary.19l 
Fiduciary duties are based on the structure of the relationship.192 
The likelihood of harm and the magnitude of the potential harm sup-
franchisor liability for breach of fiduciary duties to franchisees). A discussion 
about the creation of specific fiduciary duties in the lending relationship is be-
yond the scope of this Article; therefore, the following discussion will focus solely 
on general fiduciary duties created by a court's determination that a mortgage 
broker becomes the agent of a borrower based solely upon her status as a "bro-
ker." For a thorough analysis of the creation of specific fiduciary duties within 
the lender-borrower relationship, see Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Price of Trust: An 
Examination of Fiduciary Duty and the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 719 (1994). 
187. Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 
595, 635 (1997) ("[T]raditional fiduciary loyalty strictures more rigorously protect 
... against opportunistic behavior ... than does classic contract doctrine."). 
188. See Smith v. Van Gorkham, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
189. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1399, 1490-91 (distinguishing contract duty of good faith from fiduciary 
duty by stating that "[t]he only material difference between the relationships is 
that contracting parties 'exercise ... discretion in performance' whereas fiducia-
ries exercise discretion with respect to a critical resource." (quoting Steven J. 
Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 
94 lIARv. L. REV. 369, 394 n.109 (1980». 
190. A fiduciary duty is typically more expansive than contractual duty. While a fidu-
ciary duty is determined by the structure of the relationship, the obligation of 
good faith and fair dealing emanates from the terms of the contract. Id. at 
1490-91; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract & Fiduciary Duty, 
36 J.L. & Econ. 425, 438 (1993) ("When transactions costs reach a particularly 
high level, some persons start calling some contractual relations fiduciary, but 
this should not mask the continuum."). 
191. Common law fiduciary obligations are derived from the need to control one per-
son's discretion based on her relationship with another. See generally Kenneth B. 
Davis, Jr., Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking-Some Theoretical Per-
spectives, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1985) (explaining fiduciary duty in the context of 
private bargaining). 
192. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 n.14 (1939) (citing Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. 
Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 590 (1875». 
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port the imposition of a duty. Thus, the principal's inability to control 
the fiduciary from acting in a self-serving and opportunistic manner 
creates a need to define a fiduciary duty as a "legal rule designed to 
limit [that] discretion."193 
Fiduciary duties may be contractual because the parties have ex-
press or implied duties for defined behavior.194 Recognizing that con-
tracts are voluntary transactions, some argue that fiduciary duties 
ought not be reduced to a waivable contract term.195 When contract 
law chooses to define fiduciary duties, it is within the parties' discre-
tion to negotiate the scope of those duties. The parties, presumably 
equals, determine under what circumstances the fiduciary consents to 
serve. The pre-determined agreement conclusively fixes the fiduci-
ary's duties.196 
Fiduciary duties may also be relational. Courts are willing to im-
ply fiduciary duties in certain circumstances-i.e., attorneys, account-
ants, real estate agents, and other confidential relationships. In those 
instances, courts resolve relational fiduciary duties on a case-by-case 
basis.197 Courts seem more likely to recognize a relational fiduciary 
duty when there is also some other egregious factor present. 19B The 
goal of fiduciary law is to reduce the principal's risk.199 Its informal-
ity makes it readily available and not subject to the constraints of the 
193. Smith, supra note 189, at 1490. 
194. Hunt, supra note 186, at 765 (arguing that the presumption against finding a 
fiduciary duty in commercial transactions is fundamentally flawed and suggests 
that instead the inquiry should be whether a fiduciary duty has arisen with re-
spect to a particular aspect of the transaction). 
195. Reza Dibadj, The Misguided Transformation of Loyalty into Contract, 41 TuLSA 
L. REV. 451, 458-59 (2006). 
196. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 
1988 Duke L .. J. 879, 879. Professor DeMott argues that, "[a]lthough one can 
identify common core principles of fiduciary obligation, these principles apply 
with greater or lesser force in different contexts involving different types of par-
ties and relationships. [Tlhe law of fiduciary obligation is situation-specific." Id. 
See also Frankel, Securitization, supra note 30, at 822 (recognizing that court's 
will inquire into the nature f the fiduciary duty even when there is a specific 
waiver of the duty). 
197. Consolo Insured Benefits, Inc. v. Conseco Med. Ins. Co., No. 6:03-cv-03211-RBH, 
2006 WL 3423891 (D. S.C. Nov. 27, 2006) (stating in dicta that such duties apply 
to attorneys); Graefe v. Vaughn, 972 P.2d 317 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (stating in 
dicta that such duties apply to accountants). 
198. Courts look for factors such as "inequality, dependence, weakness of age, of 
mental strength, business intelligence, knowledge of the facts involved or other 
conditions giving to one an advantages over the other." Yuster v. Keefe, 90 N.E. 
920, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 1910); see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Fordham, 130 
B.R. 632, 649 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) ("fiduciary obligation often involves a party 
in a position of "inequality, inferiority, or other disadvantage"). 
199. See generally Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: 
Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991); 
Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049 (2007). 
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bargaining process. But the real benefit is that fiduciary duties con-
trol behavior that is neither specifically identified nor addressed and 
gives the principal the right to justifiably rely on the actions of the 
agent.200 The discussion below focuses on fiduciary duties in dual 
agency and independent contractor classification and how the duties 
may be implied in the context of contractual good faith. 
1. Fiduciary Duty-A Comparison of Dual Agency, Independent 
Contractor, and Implied Duty of Good Faith 
a. Dual Agency 
As an instrumental part of the loan origination process, mortgage 
brokers assume a common law agency duty.201 What the borrower 
does not know is that the typical representation contract allows the 
mortgage broker to be a dual agent.202 The mortgage broker may al-
ready be an agent of one or more lenders. When the mortgage broker 
recommends a particular lender's mortgage product to the borrower, 
dual agency is created because the mortgage broker will represent 
200. See William W. Bratton, Berle & Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26 J. 
CORP. L. 737, 762 (2001); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Gov-
ernance, 18 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'y, 671, 672 (1995). 
201. See generally Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 598 P.2d 45 (Cal. 1979) (holding 
mortgage broker liable for breach of fiduciary duty towards plaintiff as principles 
in connection with negotiation of a second mortgage when loan broker misrepre-
sented the terms of the loan, including the extent of interest, late charges, and 
balloon payments); Taborsky v. Mathews, 121 So.2d 61, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) 
(holding that parties may void real estate agreement where broker did not dis-
close dual nature of his agency to purchasers); Spratlin, Harrington & Thomas, 
Inc. v. Hawn, 156 S.E.2d 402 (Ga. Ct. App.1967) (holding that dual agency pro-
hibited if not disclosed); Hughes v. Robbins, 164 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio Com.PI. 1959) 
(holding that a real estate broker who represents both parties to transaction, 
even if one of his principals were aware of such dual agency, cannot recover com-
mission from either of his principals, unless both knew of and consented to or 
acquiesced in such double employment); Lass v. Meinhart, 15 Ohio Law Abs. 272, 
39 Ohio Law Rep. 37 (Ohio Ct. App. 1933) (holding that a real estate agent has 
the sole responsibility to disclose dual agency). 
202. See Godfrey v. Steinpress, 128 Cal. App. 3d 154,177-78,180 Cal. Rptr. 95,107 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that dual agency was implied from the agent's con-
duct). Dual agency was at one point a particularly popular remedy in the real 
estate setting when a buyer challenged the lack of representation by a real estate 
broker that represented both the buyer and the seller in a transaction. Buyers 
challenged real estate brokers independence because the real estate broker repre-
sented both buyer and seller. Some courts attempted to make up for the lack of 
buyer representation by finding the cooperating broker to be an agent of the 
buyer as well as of the seller. See Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, Agency and Real Estate, 
at 2-3 (November 1986) (citing Grnadchamp v. Patzer, 197 N.W.2d 537 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1972» (on file with author). One commentator criticizes dual agency as a 
solution to deterring the real estate broker's misconduct because it only allows 
the buyer a remedy after the transaction is complete. See Matthew M. Collette, 
Sub-Agency in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: A Proposal to End the Struggle 
with Reality, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1988). 
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both the borrower and the lender in the same transaction. While this 
is a conflict of interest, it is resolved through disclosure to both bor-
rower and lender, usually in the separate contracts that they have en-
tered into with the mortgage broker. In this dual capacity, the 
mortgage broker has confidential information about the borrower's fi-
nancial condition and the lender's pricing policies. The expected out-
come is different as well. The borrower wants the lowest possible 
interest rate on the mortgage while the lender, as well as the mort-
gage broker, benefit when the interest rate is the highest. The ques-
tion becomes whether the inherent conflict of interest can adequately 
be assuaged given the dramatic differences in the borrower's and lend-
ers' interests.203 
Courts resolve the issue most often against the borrower finding no 
distinction in the broker's obligations and holding in essence that con-
tract terms waived the duty.204 What these courts have failed to rec-
203. Robert E. Kroll, Dual Agency Problems in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: 
Conflict of Interest and Interests in Conflict, 12 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 379, 379 
(1982). 
204. See Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a lender, 
who is on the opposite side of the negotiating table, does not act as a fiduciary); 
Bank of Red Bay v. King, 482 So. 2d 274, 285 (Ala. 1985) (holding that no fiduci-
ary duty exists between the parties because the parties have equal bargaining 
power and the borrower did not request disclosure); Dolton v. Capitol Fed. Say. & 
Loan Ass'n, 642 P.2d 21, 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that only special cir-
cumstances justify fiduciary duty in a debtor and creditor relationship); Cooper 
v. Burby, No. 387563, 1992 WL 97044, at *4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 1992) 
(finding that the morgage broker and borrower stand at arm's length"); Mid-
America Nat'l Bank v. First Say. & Loan of South Holland, 515 N.E.2d 176, 181 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ( holding that a "conventional mortgagor-mortgage relation-
ship . . . , standing alone, is insufficient" to impose a fiduciary relationship); 
Vacinek v. First Nat'l Bank of Pine City, 416 N.W.2d 795, 799 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1987) (stating that a customer must tell the bank or the bank ought to know if its 
customer is placing confidence in the bank); UT Communications Credit Corp. v. 
Resort Dev., Inc., 861 S.W.2d 699, 710 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (finding no relation-
ship between a bank as lender and its customer as borrower); Deist v. Wachholz, 
678 P.2d 188, 193 (Mont. 1984) (finding no fiduciary duty in a bank's debtor and 
creditor relationship); Stone v. Davis, 419 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ohio 1981) (holding 
that a "mortgage loan is an arm's length transaction"); Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co., 
Inc. v. Scott, 390 N.E.2d 320, 321 (Ohio 1979) (holding that an informal relation-
ship creates a fiduciary duty only when special trust or confidence is known); 
Production Credit Ass'n of Lancaster v. Croft, 423 N.W.2d 544,546 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1988) (holding that a borrower-customer relationship does not create a fiduciary 
relationship). 
Cf Munday v. Real Estate Advisors, Inc., No. C-95-20143-JW, 1995 WL 
549015, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 1995) (holding that a mortgage broker 
breached its fiduciary duty to borrower by failing to disclose that the non-record-
ing of certain documents is not the custom in the real estate industry); Wyatt v. 
Union Mortgage Company, 598 P.2d 45 (Cal. 1979) (finding a fiduciary duty be-
tween mortgage loan broker and mortgagor); Mitchell v. Asmes Home Loan Co., 
No. B021272, 1987 WL 13307, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 21, 1987) (stating in dicta 
that a mortgage broker may have a fiduciary duty); UMET Trust v. Santa Monica 
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ognize, however, is the triangular relationship ofthe broker, borrower, 
and lender.205 
Courts are willing to concede that an agent can serve as a fiduciary 
to more then one principal in the same transaction.206 In those cir-
cumstances, an agent must disclose the relationship with the other to 
both principals.207 Courts rarely, however, inquire into the specific 
manner in which the disclosure is made in order to see if is was effec-
tive. This is problematic because it provides a limited basis for a court 
to examine the sufficiency of the disclosure. Commonly, the borrower 
and the mortgage broker enter into an agreement for services. It is in 
this agreement, a stock, form agreement drafted undoubtedly to best 
capture the interests ofthe mortgage broker, that the borrower agrees 
to dual representation. Assuming that such a signed agreement is 
sufficient to absolve a fiduciary from liability, it is hard to imagine 
that a court that relies solely on this agreement has made the critical 
examination of the scope of the agreement or of the surrounding 
circumstances.20B 
The circumstances surrounding the disclosure and an inquiry into 
the borrower's understanding regarding the dual agency seem ger-
mane. The fiduciary's disclosure in the representation agreement ef-
fect is the borrower's waiver. As such, the court must determine 
Med. Inv. Co., 140 Cal. App. 3d 864, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that failing 
to disclose the negative legal consequences of sale leaseback financing is a breach 
of fiduciary duty); Rushing v. Stephanus, 393 P.2d 281 (Wash. 1964) (finding a 
fiduciary relationship between lender and borrower). 
205. Delsack v. Cumella, 593 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
206. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc. v. Nodvin, 598 F.Supp. 853 (N.D.Ga. 
1984) (holding that dual agency is not per se improper). 
207. See, e.g., John Conlon Coal Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. of New York,16 
F.Supp. 93 (M.D Pa. 1936) (stating that there must be notice of dual agency in 
order for it to be effective). 
208. Linda S. Mullenix, Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudi-
catory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 369-71 (1988). As 
Professor Mullinix argued, 
[Tlhe ultimate inquiry must be whether the application of contract prin-
ciples to civil law waivers adequately balances the dangers of waiver 
with the value-enhancing dimension of consent. The cases suggest that it 
does not. If a waiver represents an "alternative, informal interaction 
that the state encourages by its enforcement of the waiver," then it is 
incumbent that "courts should strive to translate the fairness of the ple-
nary interaction into the informal setting of the abbreviated one." 
Therefore, a party waiving a right should be assured the functional 
equivalent of that right in the setting in which the right is foregone. As a 
practical matter, it is the court's task to "determine the nature of the 
right that has been waived, identify the kind of protection that the right 
provides, and then require that an informal version of those same protec-
tions be provided." 
Id. at 371 (quoting Edward L. Rubin, Towards a General Theory of Waiver, 28 
UCLA L. REV. 478, 537 (1981)). 
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whether the waiver was "knowingly and intelligently" made.209 Spe-
cifically, there should be an explicit inquiry into whether the borrower 
understands the entire scope of the mortgage broker's duties as an 
agent and whether the borrower understands that the dual agency re-
lationship may inure to the lender's material benefit and the bor-
rower's detriment. Absent this type of searching inquiry, the court 
cannot determine whether the borrower is truly relinquishing her 
right or the mortgage broker is asserting the right to be a dual agent 
and by default is limiting or eliminating the borrower's right to make 
an informed choice. 
b. Independent Contractor 
Many mortgage brokers have decided to eliminate the borrower's 
fiduciary claims by determining that they are independent contrac-
tors. Independent contractors do not work under the direct control of 
a principal.210 Instead, the principal delegates a duty to the contrac-
tor and may define the scope of the work, but then leaves the indepen-
dent contractor to determine the specifics of performing the task. In 
these situations, the principal will be found liable only ifthe delegated 
duty is a non-delegable one.211 
Courts usually examine several factors when deciding what type of 
relationship the fiduciary has with the principal. Those factors include 
looking at issues as varied as whether the principal furnishes the es-
sentials to perform the work, to the principal's ability to furnish de-
tails about the kind and character of the work, to who pays the 
employees and has the right to discharge them.212 The policy justifi-
cations also relate to the principal's lack of control. Specifically, those 
209. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. L. K. Comstock & Co., Inc., 488 F.Supp. 732, 
737 (D.Nev. 1980) ("[WJaiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known legal 
right."). 
210. See generally J. A. Jolowicz, Liability for Independent Contractors in the English 
Common Law-A Suggestion, 9 STAN. L. REV. 690 (1957). 
211. Nondelegale duties are those which are so dangerous that the principal must 
take responsibility for them. Given that these loan products are often designed to 
fail, it is a significant policy decision that all lenders, regardless of their defined 
relationship status with the broker, will be held responsible. See discussion infra 
at Part 1.B.1.c. 
212. In Kisner v. Jackson, 132 So. 90, 91 (Miss. 1931), the court looked at several fac-
tors, including: 
1) Does the principal have the power to terminate the contract at will; 
2) Can the principal fix the price in payment for the work, or vitally 
controls the manner and time of payment; 
3) Does the principal furnish the means and appliances for the work; 
4) Does the principal control the premises; 
5) Does the principal furnish the materials upon which the work is done 
and receives the output thereof; 
6) Does the independent contractor deal only with the principal concern-
ing output; 
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policies presume that the fiduciary has adopted the work as her own 
and must therefore prevent any risks. They also presume that the 
fiduciary has charged the principal an amount commensurate with 
that risk. There will be liability for the principal when she is negli-
gent in selecting the independent contractor.213 
When the mortgage broker is not an employee of the lender, the 
lender is unable to control the broker's actions and or decisions. Also 
the relationship typically is not exclusive to a single lender, which 
seems to further separate the mortgage broker relationship from that 
of a fiduciary.214 The mortgage broker is "for hire" and receives com-
pensation from the lender for her services. The question becomes 
whether the mortgage broker is merely serving as a facilitator by 
bringing the borrower to the lender or as a negotiator by stepping in to 
the lender's shoes to negotiate the actual loans terms. 
The mortgage broker is responsible for presenting one or several 
lenders' criteria for approval of a loan to the buyer. Maintaining inde-
pendent contractor status requires the broker to take care not to inter-
fere in the borrower's discretion in choosing the loan products or risk 
liability. Interestingly, the lender bears some responsibility under 
this theory for the broker's conduct and should not escape liability if 
the lender has knowledge that the offered products are irresponsible 
or abusive.215 Indeed, by offering mortgage brokers predatory loan 
products or failing to require the broker to certify or independently 
investigate the broker's actions, the lender is in effect retaining super-
visory control over the mortgage broker with the broker acting in an 
manner that the lender authorizes. Furthermore, the lender's failure 
to request pertinent borrower information from the mortgage broker 
that would adjust loan terms for the benefit of the borrower raises an 
7) Does the principal have the right to prescribe and furnish the details 
of the kind and character of work to be done; 
8) Does the principal have the right to supervise and inspect the work 
during the course of employment; 
9) Does the principal have the right to direct the details of the manner 
in which the work is to be done; 
1O} Does the principal have the right to employ and discharge the sub-
employees and to fix their compensation; 
11) Is he obliged to pay the wages of said employees? 
213. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411 (1965), a principal is liable when she 
"fails to take action upon noticing the careless performance of the contractor." 
214. See generally Delsack, supra note 55, at 323 (criticizing the New York courts' 
failure to interpret a state statute as making a mortgage broker an agent for both 
the purchaser and the institutional lender). 
215. Imposing such a rule would be similar to the rules imposing liability in inher-
ently dangerous tort situations. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 410 
(1965); James B. McHugh, Risk Administration in the Market Place: A Reap-
praisal of the Independent Contractor Rule, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 662-65 (1973). 
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issue of imputed knowledge from which the lender should not be able 
to escape by claiming independent contractor status.216 
c. The Duty of Good Faith 
The duty of good faith is also used to prevent opportunistic behav-
ior. There is a contractual duty of due care and fair dealing. Implied 
within every contract, the duty requires good faith in contract 
performance.217 
A good faith duty has a similar purpose to a fiduciary duty of care 
in that it establishes a standard of conduct. It is distinguishable from 
a fiduciary duty in the manner in which the duty attaches and in its 
remedy.218 A contractual duty does not exist until the contract is cre-
ated and is not the typical vehicle for dealing with imbalance of bar-
gaining powers in contract negotiations.219 It is therefore more 
limited in the way in which it remedies the harm-essentially 
requiring a post hac determination of damages instead of deterring 
misbehavior. 
However, the distinction is more than a procedural one. As a sub-
stantive duty, a fiduciary duty requires a fiduciary to adhere to the 
duty throughout the fiduciary's action on behalf of the principal. In 
that regard, there is a continual deterrence from misbehavior. A con-
tract, because it is bargained for, usually constricts duties and obliga-
tions that the parties might ordinarily have. This is especially true in 
the fiduciary context. The duty of good faith imposes no obligation on 
the fiduciary to advance the principal's interests or even to act without 
self-interest.22o Thus, it is not proper to characterize it as a fiduciary 
duty.221 
216. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 (1958). 
217. The duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract. E. Allan 
Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 669 (1963) ("[T]he inclusion of 
an obligation of good faith performance in the Code revives an ancient, although 
largely forgotten, principle."). 
218. Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken Vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, 
and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897. 
219. Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation of Bargains: Procedu· 
ral Unconscionability and The Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925 
(discussing disproportional power and procedural unconscionability's procedural 
element, which lends itself to scrutiny of the imbalance of power). 
220. See generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 
1209, 1225-26 (1995). 
221. See Smith, supra note 189, at 1448 (stating that fiduciaries owe more stringent 
obligations than mere contracting parties). 
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2. Fiduciary Duty and Economic Risks 
Fiduciary duty is a high standard for imposing liability and must 
be affirmed in this context for several reasons. As discussed above, 
the mortgage broker's disclosure serves as the borrower's potentially 
unknowing waiver of fiduciary duty. Furthermore, the seriousness of 
the financial obligation raises the issue of whether this is a waiver 
that the law should so willingly allow a party to include as a standard 
contact term. 
The mortgage broker acts as an agent of both the lending institu-
tion and the borrower and enters into two separate contracts.222 The 
mortgage broker contracts with the borrower to provide a service. Not 
only does the agreement authorize the mortgage broker to make appli-
cations on behalf of the borrower, it also identifies the fees that the 
borrower must pay the broker.223 This service is particularly useful 
for borrowers who have complex financial circumstances or may have 
difficulty obtaining particular loans. 
The mortgage broker also has a contractual obligation with the 
lending institutional to gather all pertinent information from the po-
tential purchaser. The mortgage broker assumes the costly and time 
consuming task of taking the mortgage application, collecting the rele-
vant financial information, preparing the credit reports, and arrang-
ing for the property appraisals.224 The broker then earns a 
commission from the lender for performing these tasks. In both 
agency capacities, the mortgage broker absorbs the transaction costs 
of the deal. However, this assumption of transaction costs operates to 
achieve different results for the borrower and the lending institution. 
a. Mortgage Brokers as Market Monitors 
Mortgage brokers increase the availability and affordability of res i-
dential mortgages because they help make borrowers more financially 
literate by explaining different loan products to them. They also make 
the mortgage markets more competitive for borrowers. Mortgage bro-
kers awareness of and access to an array of lenders' loan products re-
sult in effective monitoring of lenders' rates and many products and 
offerings. Their acquired expertise is unmatched by that of the aver-
age borrower. 
Yet, herein lies the conflict. The justification for mortgage brokers 
as market monitors posits that mortgage brokers owe a fiduciary duty 
222. See discussion infra Part III.C.2. 
223. See generally Peter J. Hong, Hidden Costs to Homeowners: the Prevalent Non-
disclosure of Yield Spread Premiums in Mortgage Loan Transactions, 18 Loy. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 131 (2005). 
224. Delsack, supra note 55, at 309. 
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to the borrower and not to the lending institution.225 This is a flawed 
presumption that supports the vague and ambiguous definitions of the 
mortgage broker's duties and responsibilities. Instead, what needs to 
be done is to align the brokers' duties and responsibilities with the 
economic costs of the mortgage transaction. Doing so recognizes that 
the mortgage broker receives adequate compensation for the rights in-
herent in representing the borrower and that the borrower has paid 
the mortgage broker to absorb the risks of the transaction and has a 
legitimate expectation that both the transaction and the relationship 
will have a material benefit.226 
The duty requires the agent to act in the best interests of the prin-
cipal in carrying out the assigned duties. Failure to do so requires 
the agent to prove that an action or transaction in conflict with the 
fiduciary duty is in the best interests of the principa1.227 
Unfortunately, once a borrower discovers how economically disad-
vantageous the loan is, she realizes that the broker has implicitly or 
explicitly given her poor advice. Upon learning that the circumstance 
may be actionable, the borrower learns that the available remedies 
are ineffective and costly.228 The unstated expectation of the con-
sumer is that the mortgage broker reviews the borrower's credit file 
225. See Niels B. Schaumann, The Lender as Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 21, 26 (1992). See also Theodore H. Hellmuth, Lender Liability and 
Fiduciary Obligation: Dentures for a "Toothless Lion," 3 PROB. & PROP. 20, 22 
(Aug. 1989) ("The lender who acts as a fiduciary to the borrower is liable for al· 
most anything; the lender who does not is liable for almost nothing. This is not 
simply hyperbole. The average borrower must fend for himself or herself when 
negotiating the average loan. To the contrary, when a lender who is a fiduciary 
gains an advantage over the borrower, there is a presumption of unfairness"). 
226. See generally 1 JOHN N. POMEROY & SPENCER W. SYMONS, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 151, 157 (5th ed. 1941); DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES: DAM-
AGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.3 (1973). 
227. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 797-804 (1983). The 
common law duty of agency has protected borrowers in only a few situations-
and there is a recognized conflict among the states. Minnesota imposes a statu-
tory duty. See MINN. STAT. §§ 58.16(1), 58.02(3), (14), (19), (23) (2007) (mortgage 
broker defined as mortgage originator). The California Supreme Court used a 
statute and common law agency principles to impose a duty in Wyatt v. Union 
Mortgage Co., 598 P.2d 45, 50 (Cal. 1979) (a mortgage broker's duty to borrower 
was recognized under state agency law and California real estate law). A Penn-
sylvania court used common law agency principles in McGlawn v. Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Comm'n, 891 A.2d 757, 769 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006). A federal 
district court in Illinois permitted the inference of a fiduciary duty between mort-
gage broker and borrower using agency law principles in Epps v. Money Store, 
Inc., No. 6-C-2703, 1997 U.S. District LEXIS 17964 at *20 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 
1997). Finally, a bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania also imposed a fiduciary duty 
protecting the borrower. In re Barker v. Altegra Credit Company, 251 B.R. 250, 
259 Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000). By contrast, a federal district court in Washington 
refused to recognize a fiduciary relationship between broker and borrower. Bra-
zier v. Sec. Pac. Mortgage, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (W.D. Wash. 2003). 
228. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b.iv. 
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extensively and will make recommendations based on that review. In 
actuality, unbeknownst to the average borrower, what the broker is 
doing is much narrower. The average broker views her role as provid-
ing financing for a certain amount. Brokers will readily admit that 
they have access to many products and knowledge about the market, 
but they do not perceive that their duty is to provide financing that is 
appropriate.229 In theory and practice, there is little or no consensus 
on what the broker should do. The duties range from advising the 
borrower on a broad range of products given the borrower's personal 
circumstances to presenting a range of options for the borrower with-
out express or implied recommendations for the borrower to make a 
decision to facilitating a sale on behalf of the lender as the lender's 
agent. 
Given this range of services among mortgage brokers, borrowers 
face substantial risks in their dealings with them. Essentially, bor-
rowers are unaware, unless the mortgage broker's duties are pre-
scribed by state law, of the nature of the broker's duties and functions. 
Unless specifically discussed with them, borrowers do not know what 
services they are to receive.23o To the extent that borrowers place re-
liance on the mortgage brokers' expertise, the borrower implicitly ad-
mits not having the expertise to make loan comparisons. Taking away 
the fiduciary duty imposes tremendous costs on the borrower-eco-
nomic as well as social. The borrower needs germane information to 
assess the potentially detrimental features of the loan as well as the 
knowledge base to assess whether the loan fits her financial situation. 
b. Mortgage Brokers and Transaction Costs 
Analyzing the structure of the mortgage broker's relationship to 
the borrower leads to the conclusion that imposing fiduciary duties, in 
this context, would reduce the economic costs associated with con-
ducting complex commercial transactions.231 By indirectly supervis-
ing conduct, the imposition of fiduciary duties deters bad actors. They 
differ from express contractual obligations because of the absence of a 
229. Preserving the American Dream: Predatory Lending Practices and Home Foreclo-
sures, Before the S. Banking and Urban Affairs Comm., HOth Congo 17 (2007) 
(statement of Harry Dinham, President of the National Association of Mortgage 
Brokers), available at http://banking.senate.gov'-filesldinham.pdf. 
230. For example, borrowers may be unaware that they are entitled to sue under state 
deceptive fraud statutes. See generally Glenn Kaplan & Chris Barry Smith, 
Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product Safety Net: Using State Unfair Prac-
tices Laws to Make Handguns and Other Consumer Goods Safer, 17 YALE J. ON 
REG. 253 (2000). 
231. G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Con-
tracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 V AND. L. REV. 221, 230 (1991) ("Trans-
action cost economics uses the concepts of asset specificity and the resulting 
danger of opportunism to predict the form business enterprises will take."). 
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bargain context and the foresight that negotiation of the best terms 
requires.232 More importantly, fiduciary duties can cover unforseen 
circumstances.233 
By reducing the inherently high economic costs of direct monitor-
ing and detailed bargaining, or economizing the transaction costs as-
sociated with the relationship, the fiduciary obligation serves a 
particularly useful function. Fiduciary duties serve to make the 
transaction economically efficient because they serve as a check on the 
fiduciary's abuse of power. It is the actual exercise of the fiduciary's 
relationship that gives her a controlling influence. While the actual 
scope of the fiduciary duties may seem limited, it is the potential to 
use the granted duties more broadly that makes the relationship work 
as a constraint on decision making. This fiduciary's function is too 
critical to be relegated to whether it is bargained for or not. Whether 
the bargaining power is equal or unequal, or the principal is sophisti-
cated or unsophisticated, the fiduciary has the capacity to create and 
expose the principal to risks.234 
Furthermore, the imposition of fiduciary duties is appropriate in 
the mortgage broker context when the nature of financing the obliga-
tion is one involving structured financing. 235 Mortgage brokers rou-
tinely recommend mortgages that are innovative, alternative forms of 
financing and in that regard may be both unconventional and sophis-
ticated.236 Although innovative mortgage products are commonly 
232. See also Robert D. Cooter & Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative 
Negligence, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067 (1986). 
233. See Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of Fiduciary Duties: A Theory of Good 
Faith for Unincorporated Firms, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 164 (2006) (dis-
cussing waiver of fiduciary duties as providing no protection from unforseen cir-
cumstances). See also Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO-breach of 
Fiduciary Duty or Business as Usual? 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2023, 2062 (2002) 
(discussing how fiduciary duties compel an agent to act in a fair and ethical man-
ner whenever unforseen circumstances arise). 
234. Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 227, at 808~9 (1983) ("A central feature of 
fidUCiary relations is that the fiduciary serves as a substitute for the entrustor 
. . . . The power that the fiduciary obtains is originally vested in someone else, 
and is delegated to the fiduciary not for his own use, but solely for the purpose of 
facilitating the performance of his functions."). 
235. Loans, including subprime loans with alternative financing features, include ad-
justable-rate mortgages, wrap-around mortgages, balloon payments, Alt-A mort-
gages, option ARMS, negative amortization, no-doc loans, no down-payment 
loans, piggy-back loans and loans with high prepayment fees. Structured financ-
ing can make it difficult to re-construct obligations because mortgage tranches 
are divided according to the investor's interest. 
236. Taiesha L. Cantwell, Yield-Spread Premiums: Who's Working for the Borrower? 
HUD's Erroneous Regulation and its Bar on Plaintiffs, 21 LAw & INEQ. 367 
(2003); see also David Listokin, Elvin K. Wyly, Brian Schmitt & loan Voicu, The 
Potential and Limitations of Mortgage Innovation in Fostering Homeownership in 
the United States, 12 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 465 (2001) (analyzing and discuss-
ing several of these alternative forms of financing). 
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found in the marketplace now, what makes them problematic is their 
structured nature. Structured financing mortgages are more difficult 
to understand and therefore require constructive advice from the 
mortgage broker who recommends these transactions and who has ex-
pertise in the various financing schemes. 237 Imposition of a fiduciary 
relationship between the broker and borrower would make encourage 
the broker to give constructive advice. 
Mortgage brokers facilitate these transactions by implicitly, if not 
directly, representing to customers that the transactions are afforda-
ble. Affordability requires that under normal circumstances the long-
term obligation will net a benefit for the homeowner resulting in own-
ership of the property and receipt of the property equity. Reliance is 
reasonable because the typical borrower will not have sufficient 
knowledge to evaluate the risk and benefits of the transaction.238 The 
expectation is that the mortgage broker will make a complete review 
of all of the pertinent information and throughly explain the transac-
tion to the borrower. 
The nature of the disclosure and the full scope of the duty is con-
textual because both depend on the transaction. Nonetheless, the un-
conventional aspects of the transaction must be thoroughly explained 
and should be independently evaluated for affordability. Disclosing 
knowledge and material facts about the transaction requires that the 
mortgage broker make an independent evaluation of the risks and 
benefits of the proposed loan. Codifying this type of requirement is 
consistent, therefore, with a common law action establishing a duty 
because it is the expectation of the borrower that the mortgage broker 
will perform more than a clerical function in processing the borrower's 
loan. That expectation is a reasonable one and therefore must be con-
sidered when evaluating the parties's agreed upon contractual duties. 
Significant to a breach of duty in agency law is whether the agent 
has placed the interests ofthe principal before those of the agent. Any 
rule regulating mortgage brokers must provide a bright line test that 
237. Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining the Role of Securitization: Before 
the S. Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Invest Securities of the S. Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs Comm., 1l0th Congo 33 (2007) (statement of Christo-
pher Petersen, Assistant Professor of Law, Levin College of Law, University of 
Florida), available at http://banking.senate.govUileslACFE4F.pdf. 
238. Support for this position is found in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which 
implies reliance by the principal on the agent and therefore requires a duty 
whenever such reliance is reasonable. Section 378 provides: 
One who, by a gratuitous promise or other conduct which he should real-
ize will cause another reasonably to rely upon the performance of defi-
nite acts of service by him as the other's agent, causes the other to 
refrain from having such acts done by other available means is subject to 
a duty to use care to perform such service or, while other means are 
available, to give notice that he will not perform. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 378 (1958). 
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makes clear that self-dealing and dual agency are not permitted. In a 
structured financing transaction, not only is the lending arrangement 
unconventional but the mortgage broker's involvement with a credit-
impaired borrower is by its very nature rehabilitative. The expected 
outcome is that the mortgage broker will re-construct the typical 
mortgage arrangement so that the borrower will be able to afford the 
loan. The mortgage broker reforms the transaction to make that 
which was unaffordable as a conventional mortgage become affordable 
as a subprime mortgage. While undoubtedly providing a service in 
qualifying a borrower that might otherwise not be eligible for any type 
of mortgage loan, the subprime borrower also takes on additional risks 
by becoming eligible for a loan. It is the act of qualifying the borrower 
that creates the conflict of interest. When the mortgage broker, as an 
agent of the borrower, earns a commission by qualifying the borrower, 
there is a duty to inform the principal, the borrower, of all material 
facts relating to the mortgage transaction. 
The failure of a mortgage broker as an agent to draw the bor-
rower's attention to significant risks is problematic in another aspect 
as well. When scrutinizing the transactions post hac, it is often diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to reconstruct the transaction to determine 
whether the pricing of the loan has considered all relevant factors 
from the borrower's perspective.239 For a borrower who is presumably 
financially unsophisticated and unable to fully evaluate the risks and 
benefits of the proposed transaction, the unconventional, structured 
finance loan, is complex. Because of the unusual attributes and com-
plexity of such a transaction, the borrower needs and deserves a great 
deal of assistance. Typically the borrower will not have sufficient in-
formation to independently evaluate the risks and benefits of the pro-
posed transaction. A fiduciary duty requires full and complete 
disclosure of all material aspects of the transaction with disregard to 
how such disclosure might compromise the mortgage broker or agent's 
financial benefit.24o The mortgage broker's duty to exercise reasona-
ble skill and care is one of knowledge that depends on the context. 
Resolution of whether the duty was met may depend on whether there 
were other professionals involved or the borrower relied solely on the 
mortgage broker for advice.241 Highlighting the "reliance on an ex-
pert" part of the standard demonstrates that the borrower's perspec-
239. Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 58, at 348--51. 
240. Robert Litan et aI., The Community Reinvestment Act After Financial Moderniza-
tion: A Final Report (2001) (prepared for the Department of the Treasury), avail-
able at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports.finalrpt.pdf. 
241. As proposed below, borrowers need a private right of action. The Real Estate 
Settlement Practices Act does not provide a private right of action. The Truth in 
Lending Act provides one, but it is inadequate because of its one-year state of 
limitations. Fogel, supra note 57, at 440. 
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tive of the breadth of the brokers' advice and knowledge is crucial.242 
A critical inquiry focuses on identifying the exact nature and extent of 
the broker's services. 
IV. A PARTIAL RESPONSE TO A MARKET 
THAT FAILS BORROWERS 
The goals of equality and justice in the subprime market are not 
inimical to a free market. The consumer mortgage market has under-
gone a dramatic transformation and needs to become more uniform 
and efficient in order to function well and equitably. The subprime 
mortgage market is basically unregulated and is dominated by a non-
bank financial system. This transformation follows changes that have 
occurred in the financial services industry but without the necessary 
adjustments to the current regulatory structure.243 
A. Why a Federal Approach is Needed244 
The lack of uniformity in mortgage broker regulation allows mort-
gage brokers to focus narrowly on selling a product rather than pro-
viding a level of expert service for complex transactions to the 
borrower. The absence of a uniform statute means the terms of the 
written contract vary with each transaction. In many instances, bor-
242. Teri J. Dobbins, Losing Faith: Extracting the Implied Covenant of Good Faith 
from (Some) Contracts 84 OR. L. REV. 22 (2005) (arguing that such a duty ele-
vates the implied duty of good faith to a duty of full disclosure). 
243. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Consuming Debt: Structuring the Federal Response to 
Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 43, (2005) (recommending 
changes to consumer debt regulatory structure). 
244. On March 31, 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department released its Blueprint for a 
Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure (The Financial Modernization 
Blueprint). The improvements are designed to both stabilize the market and 
enhance financial innovation, while also providing gTeater consumer protections. 
The Financial Modernization Blueprint recommendations on mortgage 
origination call for consistent national standards for all types of mortgages and 
consistent enforcement at the federal and state levels. The Blueprint has three 
components, specifically, the report recommends: 
1) the creation of a new federal commission led by a Presidential 
appointee, to evaluate, rate, and report on the adequacy of each state's 
system for licensing and regulating participants in the mortgage 
origination process. Federal legislation should establish uniform 
minimum qualifications for state mortgage market participant licensing 
systems; 
2) national mortgage lending laws promulgated and implemented by the 
Federal Reserve; and 
3) clarification and enhancement of the federal enforcement authority 
over these laws. 
See, Department of Treasury, The Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a 
Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, 2008, 78-82, available at http;// 
www.treas.gov/press/releases/reportsIBlueprint.pdf. 
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rowers waive any duty that the brokers have to them, or worse yet, 
depend on brokers for solid advice but are not really aware when the 
advice is incomplete, misleading, or simply not there. Consequen-
tially, many borrowers are uncertain about the scope of the services 
provided by the mortgage broker as well as the proportion of the com-
pensation owed to the mortgage broker. Because home ownership is 
such a deeply-ingrained American value, indisputably a part of the 
country's economic and social fiber, mortgage brokers who now origi-
nate at least half of all home loans should be governed by a compre-
hensive and effective federal standard that the states implement. 
The current regulatory scheme is incongruent. Even with the 
great many local and state statutes, regulations, and policies regulat-
ing mortgage brokers, there has not been the dramatic market effect 
that underscores a resounding policy. The possibility of success for 
individual litigants is not predictable and is costly. The probability of 
dormant claims due to an inadequate and ineffective system ofresolu-
tion underscores the need for a federal approach. 
A federal law that completely preempts state law is unnecessary 
for a number of reasons. First, it ignores federalism concerns and the 
traditional sharing of power and authority by the state and federal 
government in this particular area. Again, Justices Stevens' state-
ment that consumer law is "quintessentially an area of state regula-
tion" is rather foreboding. A uniform standard specifically affirms a 
broker's fiduciary duty to the borrower. It gives borrowers an estab-
lished set of expectations and information-based points from which to 
be able to assess mortgage broker violations. Uniformity in this area 
also provides a borrower a private right of action in addition to the 
enforcement actions that may be brought by the state government.245 
Moreover, it is important to understand why this needed uniformity 
cannot be addressed solely through the Federal Reserve's regulatory 
authority. The structured finance operations that created and con-
tinue to support this credit market have extended beyond the tradi-
tional banking system into the non-bank financial system. To rely on 
the banking system's limited role as an intermediary in the subprime 
mortgage credit market diminishes the effect that regulatory inter-
vention can have in stemming the current crisis. Thus, the regulatory 
arm must reach wider than the Federal Reserve's limited jurisdiction 
over the banking system. 
245. Cf, Robert M. Jaworski, Just When You Thought it Was Safe to Go in the Water: 
Recent Court Decisions Regarding Yield Spread Premiums Class Certification, 11 
Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 91 (1999) (advocating need for YSP class action morato-
rium legislation). 
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B. Defining Fiduciary Duty Principles for Mortgage Brokers 
Whether borrowers should have contractual rights or statutorily 
imposed rights raises issues of how broad the duties should be. If ne-
gotiated terms apply, a borrower is able to protect herself only if she 
has equal bargaining power. Mortgage brokers have greater power 
over the negotiation process because they are familiar with the specif-
ics. More likely than not, the mortgage broker would rebuff a bor-
rower's objection to a dual agency provision. Borrowers unknowingly 
contract to make mortgage brokers independent contractors. Simi-
larly, borrowers may not be aware of the implied duty of good faith. 
Later, a borrower is left with little recourse. 
On the other hand, if fiduciary duties are created by law, the duties 
do not have to be negotiated and may encompass specific obligations. 
Indeed, statutorily imposed fiduciary duties can require mortgage bro-
kers to thoroughly review the borrower's financial information, com-
pare the benefits of certain mortgage products and adequately disclose 
the risks of the recommended mortgage products. The exact nature 
and extent of the mortgage broker's services must be identified. Be-
cause assessing care and skill is not a simple matter, it is more effi-
cient and predictable to establish a bright-line test.246 
The federal legislation creating a fiduciary duty for mortgage bro-
kers to protect consumers from undisclosed information and ineffec-
tive counseling should have three parts. First, the law should 
incorporate some standards of industry uniformity. It should prohibit 
mortgage brokers from making any loan recommendations unless they 
can document the borrower's ability to repay at the indexed rate and 
require written disclosures with clear and specific language explain-
ing to the borrower when and how the terms of the loan change. The 
call for financial literacy, while inappropriate as a comprehensive so-
lution, can be heeded as well. To the extent that notices can be 
drafted with clear and specific language explaining the product that 
the borrower is agreeing to, borrowers become more knowledgeable, 
better informed, and able to reject some offered products as 
inappropriate.247 
246. To assess care and skill, not only are the representations and warranties made by 
the broker important, but also the agent's level of knowledge and experience and 
even level of compensation will be significant. Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schi-
pani, Fiduciary Constraints: Correlating Obligation with Liability, 42 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REV. 697, 705 (2007) (discussing an agent's level of expertise in context of 
corporate officer and director fiduciary duty). 
247. Borrower protections could possibly include: proof of income from borrowers; abil-
ity to re-pay; fiduciary duty in underwriting requirements; guarantee that prop-
erty taxes and insurance bills are covered; no prepayment penalties; and no yield 
spread premiums. 
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Second, the statute should require a non-waive able legal standard. 
This standard is important because borrowers are unknowingly giving 
up their rights when they initially retain a broker. By calling a bor-
rower's signed statement agreement to dual agency disclosure, there 
is a legitimacy attached to it. The "disclosure" is an unceremonious 
waiver although it is presented as a simple contract term. Borrowers 
are led to equate a retainer condition to the relinquishment of a legal 
right. This is patently unfair.248 
Third, the test of breach should be a bright line standard that eval-
uates the broker's affirmative actions and conduct towards the bor-
rower. A test of active persuasion is less onerous for mortgage 
brokers, but requires borrowers to meet a more difficult standard of 
proof. Thus, balancing leniency in favor of the borrower when there is 
an "exotic" mortgage product in the transaction requires only a show-
ing that the borrower accepted a product that was inconsistent with 
the borrower's true risk. The mortgage broker would therefore be 
found liable for breach of fiduciary breach if the borrower was advised 
to accept abusive loan terms based on specific statements or actions 
that can be both attributed to the lender and verified.249 
Finally, the statute must specify when the Federal Reserve, OCC, 
OTS, or FDIC, as federal baking regulators should take civil enforce-
ment action against states. The policy should be limited to those 
times when a state (1) fails to take any action to implement the mort-
gage broker laws; (2) fails to take timely and appropriate action when 
there is a charge of mortgage broker abuse; and (3) has a situation 
that involves precedent-setting issues or issues in which federal in-
volvement is needed to ensure national consistency. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The sub·prime mortgage saga is the same old story. 
The little guys get tough love. 
The big guys get forgiveness . . . .250 
Undoubtedly, the market has failed many hard-working Ameri-
cans and dashed their dreams of home ownership. Many subprime 
borrowers find themselves subject to even more inequality as they lose 
248. The statute can also address industry uniformity by requiring Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac to have uniform underwriting standards. 
249. Plaintiffs will have to allege that there was a there was an equally effective, less 
financially burdensome loan product that they would qualify for. To avoid the 
same problems that have arisen in litigation involving housing discrimination 
regarding the defendant's burden of proof, legislation should specify the burdens 
of proof to avoid confusion. See Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate Im-
pact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 47 EMORY L.J. 409, 491(1998). 
250. Robert B. Reich, Who Gets Bailed Out? You Guessed It, Sept. 19, 2007, http:// 
www.robertreich.org/reichJ20070919.asp. 
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their primary economic base. This failure is due, in part, to the trans-
formation of the residential mortgage market. Mortgage brokers, 
whose participation in loan originations constitutes at least half of the 
mortgage originations in this country, are a largely unregulated force 
in the market. While mortgage brokers are not the sole source con-
tributing to the market's failure, they have powerful incentives to en-
gage in lending abuses. More efficaciousness in the regulation of 
mortgage brokers and more defined duties regarding their relation-
ship with borrowers will provide borrowers with more protection and 
reduce the occurrence of lending abuses. 
The mortgage lending market is deeply flawed in another way as 
well. The economic performance of subprime mortgage products has 
perpetuated common myths about subprime borrowers. These myths 
are effective in perpetuating greater social marginalization. The sub-
prime market has far too many reckless lenders. It operates devoid of 
the needed critical assessment that allows this crisis to be manifest 
not as one of credit-impaired borrowers but as a social one. Only when 
the use of abusive subprime lending products is recognized as a per-
mutation of the persistent problem of unfair lending practices can the 
myths be corrected and the economic performance of the subprime 
market addressed equitably. This calls for the same precautions to be 
applied to lenders, distributors and investors. Both failures-a mar-
ket that has failed subprime borrowers and a market failure of ineffi-
cient loans-dictate a change in legislation and policy to ensure fair 
and equal access to credit. The notion of voluntary policing is neces-
sary but insufficient given the scope of the problem. While mortgage 
brokers are not the only source of the subprime lending problem, their 
participation in this market segment is significant. Unregulated 
mortgage brokers have incentives to engage in lending abuses. A 
modest intervention in the regulatory environment will protect bor-
rowers from being compromised. Borrowers can be given sufficient 
protection if existing laws are expanded to require the mortgage bro-
ker to act as a fiduciary to the borrower. Moreover, the proposed 
changes to the borrower-broker relationship will have a greater public 
benefit because these changes will protect all borrowers. 
Public policy can strike a proper balance between the access that 
mortgage brokers provide to credit-impaired borrowers, mortgage sus-
tainability, and a profitable mortgage industry. The equitable concept 
of fiduciary duty addresses this gap in borrower protection by placing 
the obligations of disclosure on mortgage brokers, bankers and lend-
ers. By enacting this law, Congress will be taking an important step 
to address legitimate concerns in a way that ensures a competitive 
market while protecting consumer's economic interests. 
